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27 February 1959

OCI No. 0836/59

Copy No. 53

**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STAFF STUDY**  
**"RECTIFICATION" IN COMMUNIST CHINA**  
(Reference Title: [REDACTED])

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**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STAFF STUDY**

"Rectification" in Communist China

This study is a working paper, reflecting information received through December 1958. The paper offers a full account of Communist China's recent "rectification" campaign: the introductory phase of 1956 and early 1957, in which the Chinese Communist party set the objectives of improving its working style and bettering its relations with the masses, and encouraged outside criticism; the formal launching of the campaign in May 1957, a month in which the enthusiasm and scope of criticism gave the party a very disagreeable surprise; the deflection of the campaign, in the summer of 1957, into a period of "anti-rightist struggle"; the merging of the struggle and the party's rectification, in autumn 1957, to make a nationwide rectification campaign; and the identification of the remodelled campaign, early in 1958, with the "great leap forward." As it turned out, the rectification campaign was of most interest in showing the response of party leaders to a crisis, in particular their determination to maintain a united front. The summary and conclusions of this paper appear on pages 97 through 108.

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"RECTIFICATION" IN COMMUNIST CHINA

On 1 May 1957, the Peiping People's Daily, organ of the Chinese Communist party's central committee, published a central committee directive that the entire party would conduct a new "rectification" campaign. Banner headlines proclaimed that the campaign was to be directed against "bureaucratism, sectarianism, and subjectivism" and would have as its theme "the resolution of contradictions among the people." This was the formal inauguration of a campaign which, with far-reaching changes in direction and emphasis, was to dominate the domestic scene in Communist China throughout the rest of 1957 and the early months of 1958.

Because of the elaborate introduction which preceded it, the circumstances of its inception, and the vicissitudes which it encountered and which caused it to be radically altered, the rectification campaign can be profitably studied to gain an insight into the policy-making process in Communist China. The Chinese Communists have been engaged in one campaign or another ever since their assumption of power in 1949; the rectification of 1957 recapitulates the important features of these movements and adds some of its own.

The Origins of "Rectification"

The origins of the campaign go back 20 years to Mao Tse-tung's 1937 pamphlet "On Contradictions." His speech of February 1957 which keynoted the rectification campaign was an elaboration of the earlier thesis. Although the general situation of the Chinese Communist party had vastly changed between 1937 and 1957, there were some basic similarities. As will be discussed below, the party was faced in both instances with a complex set of problems, internal and external, which required for their solution the somewhat incompatible achievements of greater discipline among party members and improved relations with the nonparty masses and officials.

The Chinese term for a rectification campaign is a contraction of a phrase meaning "to correct the style of work," which is derived from a speech delivered by Mao Tse-tung at the Chinese Communist party's headquarters in Yen-an in 1942 when the original rectification campaign began. The Chinese Communists claim that Mao's invention of the rectification process was a great contribution to the "Marxist-Leninist theory of party-building." Mao himself said in Moscow

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in November 1957: "In many years of revolutionary practice we have developed the method of the rectification campaign in accordance with the Leninist principles of keeping in close touch with the masses, recognizing the initiative of the masses, and practicing criticism and self-criticism."

Mao inaugurated the 1942 rectification when, on 1 February, he delivered an address at the opening-day ceremonies of the party school in Yen-an. In his speech, he vigorously attacked subjectivism and sectarianism in the party and formalism in literature and art. He urged party members to work energetically to correct their ways of thought and action. A week later, Mao and the party's then propaganda chief Kai Feng elaborated on the evils of formalism. After a series of discussions and the appearance of several editorials and articles, the central committee's propaganda bureau on 3 April announced a formal rectification movement for the entire party.

A number of developments prompted Chinese Communist party leaders to "rectify" the party in 1942. In 1937, two years after Mao's assumption of leadership of the party, full-scale war with Japan had broken out. This led to the formation of the United Front between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist party and the establishment of the Communists' "Anti-Japanese War Bases." This was followed by a very rapid expansion in party membership from about 40,000 in 1937 to hundreds of thousands by 1942.

The circumstances in which the party found itself after 1937 demanded a program which would gain and hold the active friendship of the greater part of the population in the War Base areas. The party had no assurance of control of the War Bases and had to make maximum use of persuasion and indirect control instead of force and dictation. It was evident that doctrinaire methods and an attitude of aloofness on the part of party members could not serve these ends.

The party thus found itself faced with two major problems in 1942. It had first to integrate into the party a vast number of new members, who had to be educated to orthodoxy. Secondly, it had also to teach its members to deal adroitly with the nonparty population so as to elicit and maintain its active support of party policies. The rectification movement was a partial answer to these problems.

The central committee directive announcing the 1957 rectification campaign had been foreshadowed for many months.

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During the summer of 1956, provincial party congresses were held as a prelude to the September National Party Congress. At these provincial meetings, a major topic of discussion was shortcomings within the party including commandism, bureaucracy, and subjectivism. Retiring provincial party committees were often severely criticized for their failings, and a general streamlining process was carried out in party organizations at the provincial level and below.

The timing of the campaign and the fanfare which preceded its introduction were influenced by Chinese Communist interpretation of events in Hungary and, to a lesser extent, in Poland during 1956. Before and during the Chinese Communist party congress in September 1956 it was evident that some sort of party reform was envisioned for the not too distant future. Not until 15 November 1956, however, shortly after the Eastern European disturbances, was there an indication that a formal reinstitution of a rectification campaign on the 1942 model was contemplated. Mao's linking of the Hungarian disturbances with failure to resolve contradictions among the people also suggests the significance of this factor in the timing and extent of the rectification campaign.

The time was appropriate for the party reform for other reasons also. The greatly accelerated socialization and collectivization program which Mao had personally advocated in 1955 had been "basically completed" by the fall of 1956. The relative success of this program may have prompted Mao and other top Chinese Communist leaders to conclude that the need for coercive measures had passed, and that broader popular support for party policies could be sought without critical danger to the party's position.

The Chinese Communist party in 1957 consisted very largely of members who had not been in the party during the periods of war and civil struggle in which the party had received its final tempering before taking control of the entire mainland. These newer members had been subjected to occasional ideological reform movements but not to so comprehensive or painstaking a process as a full-scale rectification. Meetings of party organizations which preceded the eighth party congress in September 1956 demonstrated concern with the problems of bringing wayward members into line and eliminating the small minority that could not be saved. The precedent thus set was to continue throughout the campaign and eventually affected even some party members of long standing.

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Another motive for party reform was the vast proliferation of the government bureaucracy in the eight years following the Communist takeover. Since this bureaucracy was led and, to a large degree, manned by party members, the party provided a convenient instrument for the thorough overhaul of the bureaucratic mechanism. The error of bureaucratism was usually mentioned first in listing the targets of rectification during the preliminary and early stages of the campaign, although active measures were not taken to promote this phase of the movement until later. These measures will be referred to in the discussion of the actual course of the rectification campaign.

The earliest explicit statement of the themes which were developed in Mao's contradiction speeches occurred in the first Chinese Communist response to Soviet criticism of Stalin. This took the form of an article in the People's Daily of 5 April 1956 entitled "On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat." The article was said to be "based on the discussions of the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China." This article stated the thesis that contradictions could persist even in a Communist society. "Viewed in this light," the article said, "the existence of contradictions between the individual and the collective in a socialist society is nothing strange."

In December 1956, the People's Daily published an article called "More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," a sequel to its April comment on "de-Stalinization." The later article again commented on contradictions and introduced the distinction between those "between the enemy and ourselves" and those "within the ranks of the people." It also noted that "under specific conditions a certain contradiction among the people may be gradually transformed into an antagonistic contradiction when one side of it gradually goes over to the enemy." The article made use of the formula devised during the 1942 rectification campaign and elaborated on by Mao in his February contradictions speech: "Contradictions among the people themselves can and ought to be resolved, proceeding from the desire for solidarity, through criticism or struggle, thus achieving a new solidarity under new conditions."

In the months that intervened between these articles, two other important statements appeared on the question of contradictions and how to deal with them. In May 1956 Lu Ting-i made a speech before a gathering of Chinese scientists,

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writers, and artists in which he revealed the content of the speech made by Mao three weeks previously which had introduced the "hundred flowers" liberalization policy. Lu thus performed for Mao in that instance a service similar to that which he rendered later in connection with the new rectification campaign. Lu declared that contradictions between materialism and idealism would continue even in a Communist society. He said, however, that there must be a "strict distinction between the ideological struggle within the people and the struggle against counterrevolutionaries."

In September 1956, just before the eighth congress of the Chinese Communist party, an article appeared in the People's Daily which developed the distinctions between antagonistic and nonantagonistic contradictions in the course of demonstrating that antagonistic contradictions were then in the process of elimination in Communist China. With the publication of this article, the theoretical basis for the theses presented in Mao's speeches of February and March 1957 had been established.

Themes of "Rectification," Autumn 1956

At the Chinese Communist party's eighth party congress in September 1956, the first congress held in 11 years, themes were introduced which were later incorporated into the rectification movement. In this brief address that opened the congress, Mao Tse-tung pointed to the errors which were attacked in the early phases of the subsequent rectification campaign:

Among many of our comrades there are standpoints and styles of work which are contrary to Marxism-Leninism, namely, subjectivism in ways of thinking, bureaucracy in their way of work, and sectarianism in organizational questions. Such standpoints and such styles of work alienate us from the masses, cut us off from reality, and harm unity both within and without the party.

In his speech to the congress, Mao did not touch on the "hundred flowers" policy which he had introduced the previous spring. He did, however, urge that action be taken to improve relations between party and nonparty people, a major aim of rectification:

Although there are over 10,000,000 members in our party, yet they constitute a very small minority of the country's population. In the various

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organs of state and in public affairs a lot of work has to be done by nonparty people. It is impossible to get the work well done unless we are well versed in relying on the masses and cooperating with non-party people... (we should also continue to strengthen unity among all our nationalities, democratic classes, democratic parties, and people's organizations, and consolidate and expand the people's democratic united front.) We must take determined action to get rid of any unhealthy manifestations in any part of our work that are detrimental to the unity between the party and the people.

The principal address to the eighth congress was delivered by Liu Shao-chi. Called a "political report," it ranged over all facets of party and government activity, summarized past developments and laid down some guide lines for the future. Liu's references to the faults of party members and the need for rectification were not as concise and specific as those of Mao and others, but at various points, he introduced ideas which were later integrated into the initial plan for the rectification campaign of the following spring.

In a section entitled "The Political Life of the State," Liu discussed the struggle against bureaucracy as the first of the major tasks in improving the government administration. This bureaucracy, he said, was

characterized by armchair leadership which does not understand and which suppresses the opinions of subordinates and the masses, and pays little attention to the life of the masses. Such bureaucracy, which manifests itself in being isolated from the masses and from reality, seriously hinders the growth of democracy in national life, hampers the unfolding of popular initiative, and holds back the advance of the socialist cause.

The struggle against bureaucracy, Liu said, would be a long one. The first step necessary to correct bureaucratic vices was the strengthening of Communist party supervision over state organs and over party members employed in government departments. Another measure recommended by Liu was greater supervision by the "masses of the people, and by the low-ranking government workers, over the organs of state." As a means of exercising this supervision, he said, "criticisms and exposures from below must be encouraged and supported. Those who suppress people making criticism or avenge themselves on the critics must be duly punished."

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In the one small portion of his speech devoted exclusively to internal problems of the Chinese Communist party, Liu said that "one of the tasks confronting the party leadership is to study and analyze past mistakes, draw lessons from them so as to be able to make fewer mistakes and, as far as possible, avoid repeating past mistakes, and prevent small mistakes from becoming big ones." One source of mistakes is the influence of bourgeois ideas which still persists and must be prevented from impairing the party's political purity.

The major emphasis of Liu's discussion of the party's internal problems, however, was on the avoidance and correction of the "leftist" expression of subjectivism--i.e., doctrinairism. He strongly attacked the "leftist-opportunist line" of Wang Ming and Po Ku who were the last opponents displaced by Mao Tse-tung in his rise to undisputed leadership of the Chinese Communist party. "Their mistaken leadership," Liu said, "caused serious defeats to the revolutionary struggle, and resulted in the loss of 90 percent of the revolutionary bases and of the workers' and peasants' Red Army." Liu then went on to claim that since Mao's assumption of leadership in 1935, "our party, under the leadership of the central committee headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, has not made any mistake in its line."

The reason for the avoidance of fundamental errors after 1935, Liu said, was that "instead of meting out severe punishment to comrades who had made mistakes, the party still assigned them to suitable leading posts. With regard to these comrades, the party patiently waited for and helped them really to recognize their mistakes ideologically." Liu summed up this method with the familiar slogan, "Take warning from the past in order to be more careful in the future; treat the illness in order to save the patient." He gave much of the credit for improving the party's work to the 1942 rectification campaign which demonstrated that, "in order to insure the smooth advance of the party's work and to avoid major mistakes, the key lies in overcoming subjectivism ideologically." This emphasis on ideology is characteristic of Liu.

As to Mao's personal role in guiding the party along its error-free path, Liu had the following to say:

As everyone knows, the reason why the leader of our party, Comrade Mao Tse-tung, has played the great role of helmsman in our revolution and enjoys a high prestige in the whole party and among all the people of the country is not only that he knows how to integrate the universal

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truth of Marxism-Leninism with the actual practice of the Chinese revolution, but also that he firmly believes in the strength and wisdom of the masses, initiates and advocates the mass line in party work, and steadfastly upholds the party's principles of democracy and collective leadership."

Liu asserted that there were still "serious mistakes of subjectivism" in the thought and work of many cadres. The remedy for these errors, he said, was ideological education rather than the practice of "ruthless struggle and merciless blows" which had been indulged in by the discredited "leftist opportunists." "Organizational methods" were not to be rashly resorted to lest they sap the vitality of the party.

In a very brief section of his speech on "Culture and Education," Liu Shao-chi called for continuation of the "hundred flowers" policy which he credited to the "central committee of the party." "On questions of academic and artistic nature," he said, "the party should not rely on administrative orders to exercise its leadership; it should promote free discussion and free emulation to foster the development of science and art." He showed his continuing distrust of existing intellectuals, however, by emphasizing recruitment of intellectuals of "laboring class origin." Liu acknowledged that the services of existing intellectuals must be used, but he warned that "we must not allow the bourgeois and petty bourgeois ideas which they bring with them to corrupt the ranks of the proletariat. On the contrary, we must make every effort to help them become new intellectuals closely linked with the working people."

Another important speech made to the eighth congress was that of party Secretary General Teng Hsiao-ping, who reported on revision of the party constitution. Teng began his report by pointing out the differences between the situation of the party in 1956 and that which obtained at the time of the previous congress in 1945. Since 1949, he said, the party had found that "to assume the position of the party in power is also to subject our comrades to the danger of easily acquiring the habit of bureaucratism." This in turn would result in "errors of subjectivism," i.e., doctrinarism and empiricism. Moreover, Teng said, "there are also those who like to consider themselves as leaders and to stand above the masses giving orders instead of consulting with the masses on all matters"--an attitude of "narrow sectarianism." Thus, Teng said, "confronted with this situation, the party must

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constantly attend to the struggle against subjectivism, bureaucracy, and sectarianism." He went on to say that the Communist party was "in need of supervision over our party organs and members by the masses of people and personages outside of the party."

Teng offered an explanation of the party's "mass line" as contained in the new constitution. This line must be re-emphasized, he said, because "it is the fundamental question in the organizational work of our party, the fundamental question in the general principles of the party constitution." The mass line "demands that party leadership be courteous and cautious." Teng condemned pride, arrogance, a domineering spirit, conceit, and failure to consult the masses which characterized the attitude of some cadres. He again gave special emphasis to the dangers of bureaucracy and the need for a struggle against a growing tendency toward this evil.

Teng Hsiao-ping next commented that the party constitution could not automatically solve all problems; he suggested a number of practical measures for carrying out the mass line. Among such measures, Teng advocated that there be "sufficient freedom and support to enable the basic-level party and government organizations to criticize expeditiously and freely mistakes and shortcomings in the work of upper level organizations." He gave considerably greater attention to a point which Liu had touched on only briefly. "In implementing the mass line and launching the struggle against bureaucracy, it is of great significance to cooperate closely with non-party personnel and utilize extensively nonparty personnel in the struggle." The significance of the relationship between party and nonparty people, Teng said,

lies in the fact that these democratic people outside of the party can play a supervisory role which our party is not easily capable of doing by relying solely on party members, that they can discover in our work certain errors and shortcomings which we have been unable to discover ourselves, and that they can be of some help to our party.

The most liberal of Teng's remarks appeared in his defense of the new provisions of the draft party constitution regarding the rights of party members to discuss freely "the theory and practice of party policy" and to criticize any party organization or personnel--provisions similar to those in the CPSU statutes. Going well beyond the Soviet position

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Teng asserted that party members, while bound to honor majority decisions of party organizations, could properly reserve their private opinions and present them to their own organization or even to higher organizations. In most cases, Teng said, dissenters would ultimately recognize the correctness of the majority position and so join the majority willingly. "If, on the other hand, the truth is shown to rest with the minority, the reservation of their right to sustain their views will enable the party to discover the truth more easily."

A fourth major speech at the eighth party congress was delivered by Chou En-lai who discussed the central committee's proposals for the Second Five-Year Plan. He had less to say about the aims and methods of the forthcoming rectification campaign than had Mao, Liu and Teng. His closing exhortation, however, seems to have anticipated the campaign and its later association with a new economic "upsurge":

Comrades, the day is not far ahead when the First Five-Year Plan will be fulfilled successfully and the Second Five-Year Plan will begin.... If only we are careful, modest, and patient and rectify subjectivism and bureaucratism in our work, we will be able to go forward in the struggle for building our country into a great, socialist industrialized, and strong country.

The resolution on Liu Shao-chi's political report passed by the congress outlined the party's basic policies for the coming years. It contained most of the elements which were combined to form the rectification movement when the campaign was introduced the following spring. On liberalization, the resolution said that the "guiding principles of 'letting flowers of all seasons bloom and diverse schools of thought contend' must be maintained so as to insure that sciences and arts flourish." On the matter of criticism and "supervision" from below, the resolution had the following to say:

It is essential to make further efforts to invigorate the democratic life of the country, oppose bureaucracy, strengthen supervision by the people's congresses over the government and criticism and supervision by the masses of people and government departments of lower levels, and make appropriate adjustment between the administrative powers and functions of the central and local authorities.

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Finally, the resolution cites for correction the same errors which the rectification campaign was originally designed to correct:

The fundamental shortcoming in the present work is that many party cadres have not yet shaken off subjectivism in thought and work. It is necessary to develop the party's mass line, carry out the principal of collective leadership and inner party democracy, and overcome bureaucracy and sectarianism.

During the months that followed the eighth party congress, there was some discussion of liberalization policies in the People's Daily and party theoretical journals. The major theoretical journal argued in January 1957 that there is "not enough independent thinking and free discussion" in current theoretical studies. The article attacked blind belief in "authorities" and advocated the extension to the party schools of "letting diverse schools contend." This extension of liberalization was never fully endorsed by the party leadership, however, and the "hundred flowers" policy remained substantially restricted to the arts and sciences until it fell victim to "antirightist" attacks during the following summer.

The formal decision to institute a new rectification campaign was announced to the second plenary session of the new central committee on 15 November 1956. Mao Tse-tung called on all government workers and economic personnel "to struggle, through rectification of work style, against tendencies toward subjectivism, sectarianism, and bureaucratism." In this connection, a party ideological journal in January 1957 defined "rectification of work style":

It is a method by which the Chinese Communist party educates cadres with Marxism-Leninism to overcome all nonproletarian thought. It comes from the rich experience gained through the summing up, by the party center and Comrade Mao Tse-tung, of the ideological work done in the past.

The journal described three phases of the method: (1) study of documents to enable cadres to distinguish right from wrong; (2) criticism and self-criticism to determine the state of mind and work of each person; and (3) correction of errors in accordance with the principles of (a) "warning a person in advance so he may do well in the future," and (b) "curing the disease to save the patient."

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Cadres were cautioned against false accusations, rudeness, hastiness, and giving too much attention to fixing responsibility rather than correcting errors.

Peiping's later claim that the rectification campaign was based on the proceedings of the eighth party congress appears to be justified. The principal elements of the campaign were introduced on that occasion. The "antileftist" character of the campaign, strongly emphasized during its early phases, was given a great deal of attention by Liu Shao-chi, while Teng Hsiao-ping spoke at length on the similar theme of the need for criticism from outside the party. It was the failure of the latter feature that brought about the radical revision of the campaign during the summer of 1957 and the institution of an "antirightist" campaign to rectify the rectification. All major speakers at the congress touched on the need for correction of the errors of "subjectivism, sectarianism, and bureaucracy"--although the order of listing varied--which became the principal targets of the rectification movement.

Prior to February 1957, the discussion of the need for rectification and its principles and goals was confined to Communist party channels. The eighth congress, the second plenary session of the central committee elected at that congress, the People's Daily and other party publications all served to disseminate the views of party leaders to the rank-and-file membership. The task of extending this dissemination beyond the party was undertaken by Mao Tse-tung in his famous speech on "contradictions," which attempted to promote one of the major aims of rectification: improvement of relations between party members on the one hand and the puppet parties and the masses on the other.

Mao's Speech on "Contradictions", February 1957

On 27 February 1957, Mao Tse-tung delivered before a Supreme State Conference an address which was to provide a major canon of the rectification campaign. A Supreme State Conference is an ad hoc body of variable membership which may be convened at the order of the chairman of the Chinese Peoples Republic and which has served in the past as a forum for major pronouncements by Mao. In this instance, the membership of the conference included the entire Chinese Peoples Political Consultative Conference, principal organ of the "united front" in Communist China, and other "democratic personages" not associated with any party. The address was entitled "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the

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People" The speech remained unpublished until 18 June 1957 when a much-modified "text" appeared at a crucial moment in the development of the rectification campaign. In the intervening months, however, there was much published comment on this speech and on another on the same subject delivered on 12 March, and there were also several private accounts of these speeches, so that the main lines of Mao's position became fairly clear. (The alterations evident in the June official version will be noted in the discussion of the period in which they were made.)

Mao reaffirmed the concept of "contradictions" which had been stated in the collective pronouncements on intrabloc relations in April and December 1956. He declared that there are important "contradictions"--conflicts of many kinds, including conflicts of interest--even in a socialist society. He specified that there are contradictions within each class--workers, peasants, intelligentsia and national bourgeoisie--and between those classes. Of more importance, he said (and repeated, in the June official version) that there are conflicts between the interests of the state (collective interests) and the interests of the person (individual interests), and between "the leadership and the led." He added that problems arise also from the "bureaucratic practices" of state functionaries.

Mao maintained that all of the above-cited "contradictions" are contradictions "among the people," and are therefore to be regarded as "nonantagonistic." They differ in kind from contradictions between "the people" (the four classes named above) and their enemies--this latter type of contradictions being "antagonistic" or fundamental. This being so, Mao said, the regime is justified in using different types of measures to handle the different types of contradictions.

For the purpose of resolving nonantagonistic contradictions among the people, Mao prescribed the formula worked out during the 1942 rectification campaign. This formula called for the resolution of contradictions by proceeding from a "desire for unity" through a period of "criticism or struggle" to achieve a "new unity" on a firmer basis. Mao cited the value of this method in 1942 in bringing the "doctrinaries" into line with the Mao-oriented mass of party members.

Mao emphasized that his approach to nonantagonistic contradictions was one of reliance in "persuasion and education,"

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not coercion. He reportedly criticized Stalin for having relied excessively on coercion for handling his problems, although he is said to have reaffirmed the position of the April 1956 statement on de-Stalinization that Stalin's merits were on balance more impressive than his faults. He is said also to have noted that the liquidation of counterrevolutionaries in China had been just about completed.

25X1A Mao's soft line of this period was particularly apparent in that part of his speech in which he reaffirmed his "hundred flowers" policy. The reaffirmation was unquestionably very much stronger in the actual speech than in the official and amended text published in June. Mao is reported to have said that his policy was absolutely necessary, that he had insisted on it despite opposition in the party, and that his critics were mistaken. (Actually, they proved to be correct. The significance of this aspect of the speech is discussed in [REDACTED] Chinese Communist policy toward the intellectuals.)

In addition to the "hundred flowers" policy, Mao also dealt with that of "long-term coexistence and mutual supervision" among the Chinese Communist party and the puppet parties. This latter policy was potentially and, as later events were to show, actually, a more dangerous one since it referred specifically to political matters rather than to the arts and sciences as had the "hundred flowers." In the published version of his speech, Mao gave very little attention to mutual supervision, and only with the apparent motive of subjecting the policy to the same severe restrictions as were imposed on other liberalization measures in the June text. The nature of these restrictions will be taken up in more detail in proper chronological sequence.

Although Mao's references to mutual supervision were obscured by the changes made in the speech before publication, a quotation in the People's Daily of 12 May 1957 provides some light. A Chinese who probably heard Mao deliver his speech quoted Mao as saying that "90 percent of the party membership do not understand the 'long-term coexistence, mutual supervision' policy." In the light of many public statements which appeared in party publications throughout the preliminary and early stages of the rectification campaign, it is evident that Mao referred to the fear of many cadres that criticism from outside the party would expose their shortcomings and add to their problems. An editorial from the Shanghai Liberation Daily, reproduced by the People's Daily in a column adjacent

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to the quotation noted above, said that some party members, confronted with the prospect of general discussion, felt "afraid, aggrieved, troubled, rushed." Such an attitude, the editorial said, was wrong and should be replaced by an appreciation of the advantages of general discussion outside party circles. Criticism from "our friends outside the party" should be welcomed, the editorial asserted, since the multifarious problems of establishing socialism could not be solved by Communist party members alone. This line, which had been conspicuous in the speeches of Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping at the party's September congress, remained in effect until criticism struck too close to home during the early weeks of rectification and stringent countermeasures were taken.

In arguing the need for resolution of contradictions among the people, Mao was reportedly careful to point out the relevance of the Hungarian example. He is said to have argued, in approximately the language of the June official text, that where "foreign and domestic counterrevolutionary elements are at work, the reactionaries in a socialist country, in league with the imperialists, take advantage of contradictions among the people to foment disunity and dissension and fan the flames of disorder in an attempt to achieve their conspiratorial aims. This lesson of the Hungarian events deserves our attention."

Although Mao's speeches of early 1957 did not contain any basic doctrinal points that had not previously been introduced, they still had unique importance. First, Mao's statements on the existence of contradictions between the leadership and the people and means of resolving them were much more forthright than earlier ones had been. Second, and more importantly, Mao's speeches were a call to action; they were not mere theoretical disquisitions. Mao reportedly made this clear at the conclusion of the section on the two different types of contradictions in his February speech. In the language of the official text:

It is imperative that at this juncture we raise the question of distinguishing contradictions among the people from contradictions between ourselves and the enemy, as well as the question of the proper handling of contradictions among the people, so as to rally the people of all nationalities in our country to wage a new battle--the battle against nature--to develop our economy and culture, enable all our people to go through this transition period in a fairly smooth way, make our new system secure, and build up a new state.

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It is apparent from the foregoing that Mao's speech of February 1957 recapitulated and elaborated on major points brought up at the September party congress about the need for rectification and the methods to be used in the process. In addition, the speech apparently went a great deal farther than had the statements made at the congress in advocating "liberal" policies in the arts and sciences and "mutual supervision" among the Communist party and the puppet "democratic" parties. Mao's advocacy of greater liberalization appears in part to have been motivated by antiregime violence in Hungary and Poland, and was clearly based on a miscalculation of the degree of opposition to the Chinese Communist party and the party's ability to cope with it by "non-coercive" means. Mao's statements anticipated to some extent the application of rectification to an economic speed-up and even to the "technological and cultural revolution" introduced at the second session of the eighth party congress in May 1958.

The rectification campaign was thus firmly identified with Mao Tse-tung. Mao was reported as issuing the first call for such a campaign in November 1956, and his subsequent speeches on contradictions became the holy writ of the movement. This is not surprising since the earlier campaign, on which the current movement was originally modeled, had been launched by Mao 15 years before and served in part as the final stage in the consolidation of his leadership of the party. Insofar as the 1957 rectification campaign was conceived as a continuation of the "liberalization" policy then being pursued in Communist China, it was an extension of a movement which had been given greatly increased impetus by Mao's May 1956 speech which introduced the "hundred flowers" policy.

In spite of Mao's close association with rectification, his personal advocacy of the campaign came only after a great deal of groundwork had been laid and after events in Eastern Europe had raised the presumption that similar disturbances might also occur in China. This approach to the campaign is similar to previous instances in which Mao or other major party leaders became identified with a certain policy line only after it had been introduced relatively quietly by lesser figures and there had been an opportunity to assess the response.

Lu Ting-i Introduces "Rectification," March 1957

During the fortnight between Mao's two speeches on contradictions, the People's Daily published an important article

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by Lu Ting-i, director of the Chinese Communist party's propaganda department. This article, ostensibly written to commemorate the 15th anniversary of the 1942 rectification campaign, was in fact the formal introduction of the new campaign. The outlines of the coming rectification were drawn clearly for the first time by Lu, who drew on ideas expressed by every top leader of the Chinese Communist party during and after the eighth party congress of September 1956.

Lu Ting-i is said to be especially close to Mao Tse-tung, a relationship dating from the earlier rectification movement when he reportedly was able to render useful services to Mao in his successful attempts to consolidate his control over the party. As Lu's position indicates, he has been used often to explain Chinese Communist policies and to elaborate on and justify significant changes in line.

Lu's introduction to the new rectification began with a review of the original campaign which had been inaugurated by the delivery of two reports by Mao at the party's Yen-an headquarters on 2 February 1942. The titles of these reports, as given by Lu, were "Rectify the Party's Style of Work," and "Opposing Party Formalism." The 15 years since this campaign proved, according to Lu, the great significance of the rectification movement.

In discussing events leading up to the 1942 campaign, Lu laid particular emphasis on the defeat of the "Wang Ming leftist opportunist line." Lu, like Liu Shao-chi in September 1956, represented the "Wang line" as a doctrinaire error which was responsible for heavy losses among the revolutionary bases and the Red Army during the four years it was in effect. Lu's article reiterated Liu's assertion that, in the more than 20 years since defeat of the Wang Ming line, the Chinese Communist party had not committed any mistakes in its national line.

In the decade between 1935 and the party's seventh congress in 1945, according to Lu's article, the party, under the guidance of its central committee led by Mao, had carried out a thorough study of previous mistaken lines and had clarified the thought of its cadres. The 1942 rectification was an important part of this ideological education, Lu said, and was largely attributable to Mao himself: "Comrade Mao Tse-tung devised the rectification campaign--a form of movement suited to inner party struggle. It is a great contribution to the Marxist-Leninist teaching on building the party."

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Lu maintained that in the development of the party's current and correct line, as represented by Mao Tse-tung, the struggle against the Wang Ming line was especially important: "Among the inner-party struggles which we have experienced," he said, "the struggle for the defeat of dogmatism was the most difficult." This was because the dogmatists wore the clothing of Marxism-Leninism and took advantage of other men's blind belief in Marxism-Leninism and the party's lack of political maturity. To expose them to party members required long and painstaking ideological education.

The article speaks of "dogmatism" as the principal expression of "subjectivism," one of the three major targets of the new rectification campaign. A long section is devoted to justifying the identification of dogmatism as the most important "subjectivism" error, and to pointing out the dangers of subjectivism.

After a long and intricate discussion of the 1942 rectification, Lu turned to certain basic current problems facing the Chinese Communist party. Undoubtedly reflecting Mao's assessment, Lu presented a sanguine picture of the situation in which the party then found itself: "Our country is already a socialist country, classes have been basically eliminated, counterrevolutionary power has been basically wiped out, intellectual elements have undergone ideological remolding, the people of the entire country have been organized." Under these circumstances, he concluded, only long-range, gentle, painstaking methods of persuasion need be used to resolve existing contradictions. The party's current policies--"Let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools of thought contend," and "long-term coexistence, mutual supervision"--are the correct policies to be applied.

Noting that the revolution had been essentially completed, Lu saw the party's problems as those involved in turning from revolution to construction. The party had successfully led the revolution, he said, but revolution is not an end but a means. He continued:

We learned how to guide the revolution but, down to the present, our experience is inadequate with respect to China's socialist construction. We have not yet become thoroughly conversant with its laws of development and are still blind to a certain degree. Our current fundamental task in ideological work is to achieve a better and quicker grasp of the laws of development of our country's socialist construction

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in order to be able to guide the work of socialist construction in such a way as to make few mistakes of any kind and no major mistakes. Thus we can, in a short time, successfully construct a great socialist nation and attain the productive level of the advanced countries. This is an extremely serious task and our party must struggle zealously to achieve it.

"The great majority of our party members exert themselves positively and their work is effective," Lu said. "Still, this is not to say that all who have entered the party organizationally have entered it ideologically." Some of these members are bound to retain subjective methods of thinking to some degree. In speaking of new members he said:

None of our new members has gone through an ideological remolding such as the 1942 rectification movement. In general they cannot be deeply aware of what subjectivism is. Among them a number still retain the unreformed thinking of the old society, and have not changed their original petty bourgeois standpoint to a proletarian standpoint.

The magnitude of this problem is indicated by the fact that the party's membership in 1942 was "several hundred thousand," according to a statement by Mao Tse-tung, while by 1957 it had surpassed 12,000,000. Thus by the time of the new rectification campaign only a minute fraction of the party membership had undergone the rectification process. "Such a situation," Lu Ting-i said, "demands that we arrange a new rectification movement throughout the entire party with the aim of setting right the cadres' style of thinking and style of work."

In conclusion Lu said:

If the coming new rectification campaign is carried out successfully, it will greatly increase the ability of our party to lead socialist construction and will play a great role in promoting the great enterprise of building a socialist China. The purpose of our commemorating at this moment the rectification campaign in Yenan 15 years ago is to make this point clear.

It will be seen that Lu Ting-i's article reiterated the vigorous attack on "leftist" doctrinairism within the party which Liu Shao-chi had emphasized in September. Lu also followed Liu in praising the leadership of Mao Tse-tung in overcoming incorrect "leftist" methods and in guiding the 1942

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rectification campaign. Like Teng Hsiao-ping, Lu noted the problems posed by the fact that the party's membership had grown enormously since the previous rectification movement. He also pointed out, as had Teng, that becoming the party in power carried with it the danger of falling into bureaucratic ways. In devoting such attention to the connection between rectification and the economic and cultural progress of the country, Lu's article repeated points that had already been made by Chou En-lai in September 1956 and by Mao in February 1957. The article extolled the importance of Mao's 1937 writings "On Practice" and "On Contradictions" and quoted from them at length, although it did not refer specifically to Mao's February speech.

Although the text of Mao's reports on contradictions was not published immediately, there were numerous "discussions" of the topic among the leadership of the non-Communist puppet parties and local Communist party organizations. The People's Daily also devoted considerable attention to the subject.

On 13 April 1957, a People's Daily editorial dealt with the question of contradictions between the people and their leaders, the boldest of Mao's innovations. "At present," according to the editorial, the "contradictions between the masses of our country and the leaders result mainly from bureaucratic leadership in work." Many leaders were accused of having acquired a habit by which "as soon as they gain power, they enforce orders and depend solely on the enforcement of orders to take the place of ideological and political work among the masses. Such a tendency to commandism is a manifestation of a bureaucratic style of work."

Ten days later another People's Daily editorial called on all Communist party organizations to deal correctly with internal contradictions among the people. The paper said that it was the "urgent task of all Communist party organizations, particularly high-level organizations and their responsible members, conscientiously to study and carry out Chairman Mao's directive on correctly treating the internal contradictions within the ranks of the people." One of the aims of this study was to consolidate the "friendly relations between the Communist party and the people."

The same editorial reported that Mao's reports had "attracted the greatest attention of all Communist party members and the people. The widespread discussion of this question by all the different social strata of the various localities has brought a striking change in the political life of our country."

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In spite of this claim of wide popularization, texts of the reports were not yet published for general circulation.

During this same period, Peng Chen, an important politburo member and second-ranking member of the party's secretariat, discussed Mao's speeches before a party meeting. He was quoted by Peiping radio as having said that the "period of class war within the country had, by and large, ended, and it was now all-important to recognize any difference that may arise within the big family of China's people are family differences which can be settled only by democratic means, that is, by discussion and persuasion proceeding from a desire for unity." According to the radio report, he stressed the importance of "encouraging the free expression of opinion, criticizing as weak-hearted and incompetent those who feared such freedom of expression."

It seems probable that not all party leaders were taking a line identical with Peng Chen's--a line which reflected the unprecedentedly "liberal" tone of Mao's various remarks of early 1957. Liu Shao-chi at the party congress in September 1956 had emphasized the need to avoid "doctrinairism," but Liu had been careful as always to state the other side of the picture--the dangerous influence of bourgeois ideas, and the unreliability of unreconstructed intellectuals. It was this darker side which had been missing from Mao's statements in early 1957. In this connection, Liu made a report to government cadres in Canton sometime prior to mid-April which was never published. The speech was presumably concerned with some aspect of Mao's policy on "contradictions," and may well have had a less liberal tone than Mao at that time thought desirable. Teng Hsiao-ping, who like Liu had apparently been in agreement with Mao's approach as of September 1956, like Liu was not associated publicly with the more liberal tone of early 1957. Another politburo member, Kang Sheng, spoke at the same meeting as did Peng Chen; Kang's speech, like Liu's earlier, remained unpublished.

"Rectification" Formally Launched, May Day 1957

It was in this atmosphere of vigorous propagandization of Mao's "contradictions" thesis that the Chinese Communist party's central committee approved, on 27 April 1957, the directive that formally launched the new rectification campaign throughout the country on May Day. After citing the "great victory" of the 1942 campaign, the directive linked the forthcoming rectification campaign to the need to "lead the transformation of the whole society and the construction of a new

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society." "In order to strive to fulfill the target of building a great socialist state," the directive said, "our party and the working class must at the same time remold themselves."

The directive then explained the necessity for further rectification in terms of the principal errors which had already been frequently pointed out as requiring correction:

In the past few years there has been in the party a new growth of bureaucracy, sectarianism, and subjectivism which departs from the masses and reality. Therefore, the central committee considers it necessary, on the basis of the policy of "proceeding from the desire for unity and, through criticism and self-criticism, achieving new unity on a new basis," to launch within the party once again an extensive, throughgoing rectification against bureaucracy, sectarianism, and subjectivism, and to raise the Marxist ideological level of the whole party and improve the working style so as to conform with the needs of socialist transformation and construction.

Referring to the new circumstances in which the party found itself, the directive said that "many comrades do not understand or understand inadequately this new situation and task of the party." Because the party is now in a ruling position and has "won the support of the masses of the people," many party members had become prone to using purely administrative measures in dealing with problems, according to the directive. Another group of party members were described as "wavering elements" who were "liable to be contaminated with remnants of the Kuomintang style of work from the old society, to think of themselves as privileged, and even resort to attacks or oppression when dealing with the masses." All of these erroneous methods of action and thought were to be identified, criticized, and rooted out in the course of the forthcoming rectification campaign.

The directive specified that the campaign would be "guided ideologically" by Mao's two reports on contradictions. These reports, according to the directive, had been "relayed to broad sections of the cadres and intellectuals and will be relayed to all party members and the people." The directive said that these reports had already stimulated vigorous discussion both within and without the party. Party committees at all levels were ordered to organize study of these reports and to examine other relevant documents in accordance with the basic ideology of the reports.

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Regarding the techniques to be applied in conducting the new campaign, the directive said that "this campaign should be a movement of ideological education carried out seriously, yet as gently as a breeze or a mild rain." The criticism and self-criticism practiced during the campaign should be carried "to the proper extent," and meetings should be limited to small discussion meetings or group meetings. The directive specifically forbade "large meetings of criticism or 'struggle'." Instead, "comradely heart-to-heart talks in the form of conversations, namely exchange of views between individuals," were to be used.

The methods prescribed for closing the gap between party members and the masses were not limited to discussion and education. The directive also provided that:

In order to strengthen the contact between the party and the broad mass of working people and to change thoroughly the situation where many of those in leading positions are separated from the masses, it is necessary, while the rectification campaign is being conducted, for the whole party to advocate and encourage that the leading personnel who hold key positions at all levels in the party, the government, and the military service, and who are fit for physical labor, should devote part of their time to engaging in physical labor with the workers and peasants. This measure should gradually be made into a permanent system.

Such activity would to a large extent eliminate bureaucracy, sectarianism, subjectivism, and "lordly airs," according to the directive.

First secretaries of party committees were charged with personal responsibility for organizing the campaign and furnishing "firm leadership." Two weeks were allowed for submission of concrete working plans to the central committee by party organizations.

The directive gave brief attention to nonparty participation in the campaign:

Nonparty people who wish to participate in the rectification campaign should be welcomed. But this should be done on an entirely voluntary basis, and no coercion is allowed. They should be permitted to withdraw freely at any time.

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The central committee directive recapitulated, more concisely than Lu Ting-i's introductory article a few weeks earlier, the major characteristics of the new campaign as envisaged by Chinese Communist leaders. It gave as a primary motive for the campaign the improvement of party leadership during the coming period of "socialist construction." It cited the success of the 1942 campaign and specified the "unity-criticism-unity" formula as the basic policy of the new movement. The directive vigorously attacked "leftist" mistakes and declared that Mao's "Contradictions" speeches would provide ideological guidance for the campaign. Party cadres were directed to study means of carrying out both the "hundred flowers" and "mutual supervision" policies, and the noncoercive nature of the movement was emphasized in the slogan devised for the new campaign: "As gently as a breeze or a mild rain." Finally, it was explicitly stated in the directive that the new rectification was to be a party movement better to enable party members to lead the rest of society; nonparty people were to take part only voluntarily.

In only two respects did the central committee directive add to previous authoritative statements. As would be expected, the directive provided specific instructions on implementation of the new campaign. In addition, the directive ordered leaders to perform physical labor to the extent that their duties and capabilities permitted. This measure gathered momentum throughout the campaign until the exploits of leaders at all levels who went out among the people to labor occupied a prominent place in the domestic news in Communist China.

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Explanations, May 1957

Publication of the Chinese Communist party's central committee directive on rectification on 1 May 1957 initiated an intensive press campaign to explain and promote the new movement. On the following day, the party's newspaper linked the May Day celebrations with rectification and devoted a part of its front page to an editorial entitled "Why Rectify?" This editorial referred the origin of the movement to the preceding party congress: "The party center directive on the rectification campaign is in reality a continuation of the resolutions of the eighth party congress."

The editorial summarized and extended earlier statements on the current situation and the need for rectification. The principal contradictions remaining in the country, according to the editorial, were not those between enemies. They were those among people who faced the demands of building of an advanced industrial country and the reality of a backward agricultural country; the need for rapid economic and cultural development, and a situation in which the existing economy and culture could not fulfill the people's needs.

This situation, the editorial said, was unique in the history of the party and the nation, and the party faced circumstances and tasks that were completely new: "Since contradictions between the enemy and ourselves will not again become the principal contradictions in the nation, the party's task in domestic problems is to unite the entire people to develop production." The goal of the new rectification campaign was said to be that the party should "learn correctly to resolve contradictions among the people in order to fulfill the glorious task of developing socialist construction and building a socialist nation."

The editorial sought in earlier statements and writings of Mao for justification of the methods to be used in the forthcoming rectification. Mao was quoted as using a proverb during the anti-Japanese war: "Toward ourselves, peaceful; toward the enemy, fierce." His 1949 work "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship" was quoted to the effect that in the process of reforming "ourselves" in the direction of socialism and communism, the methods that should be used are "democratic, persuasive methods, not coercive methods."

This editorial closed with a declaration that the point of view expressed was identical with that of Mao's February

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speech on contradictions. To put this point of view to work, it said, was of great historical significance.

During the early days of May, daily headlines exhorted party members to rectify themselves and provided examples to be followed. These examples were drawn from party organizations within the central government organs and various provincial party organizations in which rectification was apparently undertaken with great alacrity. "Leading cadres" were urged to take the initiative in reforming themselves and entering into the rectification process.

On 8 May 1957, a meeting took place which set in train a reaction that brought an abrupt shift in the rectification campaign. This was a symposium convoked by the Chinese Communist party's United Front Department for "responsible men of the democratic parties and nonparty democratic personages." The central question for this discussion, according to the People's Daily report, was: "What ideological and operational problems do the democratic parties and nonparty democratic personages wish our party to solve in the process of rectification?" Not only were nonparty people invited to criticize the Communist party and the government, but they were provided with an opportunity to respond immediately to the invitation.

Li Wei-han, director of the party's United Front Department, stated that his purpose in calling the symposium together was "to ask everybody to help us carry out rectification, to help us correct our shortcomings and mistakes." Li said that this was the first time in the history of the Chinese Communist party that the united front method had been used to carry on a rectification movement. "Because of this," he said, "it is hoped that everyone will express many critical opinions."

Among those who responded to this liberal invitation were Minister of Communications Chang Po-chun and Minister of Food Chang Nai-chi. Both of these ministers were later removed from their posts in the "democratic" puppet parties of which they were officials and, after many months, from their government posts. Both voiced a number of complaints which centered around the futility of non-Communists attempting to exercise real influence in national affairs. Although the Communist party spoke often of "mutual supervision" among the Communist and "democratic" parties, they said, there was actually no means by which this supervision could be exercised.

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critical opinions concerning the Communist party and government had been expressed prior to this symposium in response to the "hundred flowers" liberalization which had been instituted a year earlier. These had been scattered and relatively cautious statements by academic figures and had not provoked a violent reaction from the Chinese Communist party. The symposium of 8 May 1957, however, marked the beginning of a flood of unprecedentedly severe criticism by nonparty men in government posts as well as others. These criticisms were not only spoken in meetings, but were widely published in the press.

Perhaps coincidentally, on the same day that the invitation to criticize was issued, another meeting was held in Peiping at which a Communist leader hinted at the turn which rectification was to take a month later. Peng Chen, politburo member and second-ranking member of the party's secretariat, addressed a meeting of the Peiping municipal party committee on means of carrying the rectification campaign into effect. He advised his audience that the first requirement of the campaign was to study carefully the two reports of Mao Tse-tung, the central committee directive on rectification, and relevant People's Daily editorials. He emphatically explained, according to the newspaper report, that the rectification movement must be put into effect beginning from the top. That is, the process must begin with an examination of the thought and work style of leading cadres. In this way, Peng said, examples could be provided and experience accumulated which could be used in gradually extending the movement to lower levels. At each stage, opinions should be sought from those on the same or lower levels and from "friends outside the party."

Peng then turned to the "gentle wind and mild rain" aspect of the directive on rectification. He said that there were two groups who disagreed with this: those who thought that a situation of "no wind and no rain" would develop and those who thought that "gentle wind and mild rain" was only a manner of speaking but that when the campaign got under way there would be "fierce wind and heavy rain." Both these points of view were unsatisfactory, Peng said. The first view was belied by the fact that there was already much wind and rain. After the rectification campaign got underway, Peng asked, might there be "fierce wind and heavy rain?" In other words, would the party use harsh methods? In answering his question, Peng cautioned his audience that the intent of the directive on rectification was that the campaign should be earnest yet gentle. He added that "in the course of the campaign a little big wind might arise," and advised the cadres to act in "strict accordance with the demands of the directive...."

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The ambiguities of Peng Chen's statements seem to imply that cadres should not be afraid to use "a little" coercion on the subjects of rectification, if necessary to fulfill the intent of the rectification directive, and as long as the "spirit" of the gentle method was observed. This contrasts somewhat with the speech made by Peng about a month earlier in which he advocated the use of democratic and persuasive methods in settling differences among the people. His more recent advocacy of sterner methods, however, was still intended to apply solely to party members and not to nonparty critics of the regime.

Criticism Surprises Mao, May 1957

The severe criticism directed at the party during this period would fill volumes. A wealth of detailed evidence was presented in the process which could leave little doubt that the complaints were well justified. The following were some of those most frequently expressed at the symposiums and in the press:

- 1) The Communist party has replaced the government.
- 2) There is no legal code to guide the people and thus the Communist party is free to act arbitrarily.
- 3) The Communist party decides policy without even a pretence of consulting nonparty political "leaders."
- 4) Individual Communist party members have built a great "wall" or "gulf" between themselves and the common people and discriminate against non-Communists in matters of pay and promotion.
- 5) Non-Communist officials have titles but no power and are controlled by Communist subordinates.
- 6) The "mass organizations" are tools of the ruling party.

No Communist regime has ever permitted, let alone encouraged, such a flood of outspoken criticism as that which followed the summons issued to non-Communist personages by the United Front Department of the Chinese Communist party. Since control measures had evidently been effective until this time, the question arises as to what prompted the party to risk exposure of its shortcomings to the Chinese people and the world. Part of the answer is that party authorities had no idea that the dam of repression had stored up so great a reservoir of

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ill will. It will be of interest to examine some of the other reasons for the momentary opening of the floodgates.

The close relationship between the opening of the rectification campaign and the Chinese Communist party's invitation for criticism from non-Communist quarters indicates that "outside" criticism was initially regarded as an integral and important part of the rectification process.

Since a major goal of the rectification movement was to improve relations between Communist party members and the public, Communist authorities apparently believed that cadres should be exposed to a certain amount of criticism from those whose good will they were intended to seek. It appears likely, therefore, that the statement by the director of the Chinese Communist party's United Front Department that the purpose of criticism was to assist the Communists to carry out rectification and correct their shortcomings and mistakes contained a certain element of sincerity. That this tactic was not unanimously approved within the party was indicated by a comment in the Shanghai Liberation Daily that lower cadres were "terrified of the criticism of the masses."

The response to the new liberalization move was far more rapid and widespread than had been the case after Lu Ting-i's announcement of the "hundred flowers" policy. As suggested above, this response was due in part to the provision of forums at which replies might be expressed immediately. The fact that the invitation was linked with the widely publicized rectification campaign may also have lent a greater air of sincerity and thereby invoked a freer response. An additional factor may have been that the invitation was addressed not only to academic intellectuals but to "political" figures who might be more inclined to express their views publicly in the hope of influencing the course of affairs.

The Chinese Communist party may also have been motivated by a desire to foster a greater sense of participation in the government on the part of an articulate portion of the population. By thus creating an illusion of free discussion, party authorities may have hoped to relieve the party of a part of the burden of responsibility for unpopular government measures. This tactic had been pursued in theory since the founding of the Chinese People's Republic in 1949 but never in matters of fundamental importance.

The fact that the invitation was issued indicates a serious overestimation by the Communist leadership of the extent of which non-Communist intellectuals and political figures had

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been converted to the Communist point of view. It appears that the long silence from non-Communist quarters was interpreted as acquiescence rather than as the discretion which, until then, non-Communists had felt to be the better part of valor. Since Mao Tse-tung was presented as the foremost advocate of a policy of relaxation of restrictions on freedom of expression, he must also be considered foremost among those who failed to assess correctly the true attitudes of non-Communist intellectuals and puppet party leaders.

Mao was quick to perceive this error. On 25 May 1957, he spoke before a national congress of the New Democratic Youth League (now the Young Communist League) in the presence of the entire top echelon of the Chinese Communist leadership. Mao made a statement that recurred frequently during the following weeks and became the keynote of the Chinese Communist party's counterattack on its newly discovered opposition: "Any word or action that is at variance with socialism is completely wrong." Thus, less than three weeks after it was issued, the invitation to free speech was rescinded.

#### The CCP's Counterattack, June 1957

During the next few days, the counterattack gained momentum. Peiping radio announced on 3 June that the following day Ta Kung Pao, a newspaper next in authority to the Communist party's People's Daily, would carry an editorial entitled "Criticism is for Unity." The broadcast observed:

The editorial points out that it is not true that all criticism will lead to a new level of unity. Only criticism which is factual and just will serve this purpose. It is only when criticism is true and sincere and when friendly relations exist between those who are criticizing and those who are being criticized that it is possible to establish comradely unity.

This marked the beginning of an attempt to stem the flow of criticism at the same time giving the impression that one's freedom in this regard was not cut off. On the day following the Ta Kung Pao editorial, the People's Daily reprinted an editorial from a Nanking paper which urged continued intensive development of the rectification movement. Those who had been lax in their criticism, the editorial said, should increase their efforts in the "blooming" and "contending" of opinions over various questions. As for the future, "this should become the practice of today, as it should also be the practice for tomorrow, for both the rectification movement and the principle of 'let flowers of many kinds bloom

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and diverse schools of thought contend' are long-term matters." Throughout the remainder of the rectification campaign the terminology of the brief period of "liberalization" continued to be used, but the meaning of the words was greatly changed.

A considerable part of the initial counterattack on critics was carried out by non-Communists. As an entering wedge, Lu Yu-wen, assistant to the secretary general of the State Council and member of the central committee of the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang, made public a letter he had received anonymously in regard to a speech he had delivered on how to assist the Communist party in its rectification movement. The letter accused Lu of "holding candles for the devil," and warned him to change his behavior. Lu's speech probably had been intended as an opening gun in the counter-attack on critics of the regime. The letter it provoked brought the People's Daily into the fray.

On 8 June 1957, the People's Daily had this to say about the letter:

We consider this incident a major event in the political life of our country at this moment, because this letter constitutes a warning to the great masses of the people. It shows that there are persons who are trying to use the rectification movement of the Chinese Communist party as a means to carry out severe class struggles. This letter tells us that although the large-scale class struggle in our country has subsided, it is by no means completely finished. This is particularly true on the ideological front.

The People's Daily summary of Lu's speech provided a convenient text for nonparty puppets of the regime who wished to leap on the bandwagon:

1. The people should not confuse capitalist democracy with socialist democracy, nor make an attempt to weaken or eliminate the leadership of the Chinese Communist party.
2. Well-prepared documents should be readied for discussion at State Council meetings so that the mistake made by capitalist countries of turning their parliaments into forums for endless disputes without achieving results can be avoided. This practice is not designed to turn the meetings into a matter of mere formality, nor to prevent the discussion of the subjects contained therein.

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3. The speaker found no gulf or barrier between him and CCP members. If there are gulfs and barriers between other persons and CCP members, joint efforts would be made to eliminate them.
4. CCP members are entitled to the right to defend themselves against criticism. This act should not be indiscriminately taken as an act of vengeance.

Simultaneously with the publication of the People's Daily editorial the Chinese Communist party put into effect another well-worn propaganda technique in its efforts to stifle the embarrassing flow of critical opinion. In Peiping a symposium of trade union cadres and workers was held in which to air opinions on the case of the threatening letter. According to Peiping radio, "they were unanimously opposed to all kinds of false statements departing from socialism, and condemned the low trick of threatening people by anonymous letters." It was also reported that workers and staff members of many factories in Tientsin met to express their indignation. These meetings quickly developed into general attacks on critics of Communist leadership. Their limited scope suggests that they were convened hastily in anticipation of the forthcoming intense campaign to suppress opposition to the regime.

On 9 June 1957, the People's Daily developed the thesis that while criticism was perfectly correct, counter criticism was also correct. The editorial then distinguished between proper and improper criticism:

As for criticism which is not well-intentioned and which aims at undermining the socialist undertakings, the people's democratic dictatorship, and the unity between the party and the people, since it is not compatible with the interests of either the people or the party's rectification movement, it is, to be sure, all the more necessary to wage correct counter criticism against this criticism of a destructive nature.

Since there are now these two different schools of criticism, those who are responsible for the people's undertakings cannot afford indiscriminately to regard all criticism as helpful and beneficial to the people. They cannot but offer their own opinions in answer to that criticism which is wrong and of a destructive nature. If no counter criticism is offered against wrong opinions in debate, not only will it be impossible to uphold the truth, but also the socialist undertakings will inevitably suffer damage.

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The next day, the People's Daily added further direction to the Communist party's counterattack. "During the past two days," the editorial said, "many workers in Peiping, Shanghai, Tientsin, Mukden, Anshan, and other areas have successively held symposiums during which they indignantly denounced the reactionary, antisocialist views of the extremely small number of rightists." Assuming further the role of spokesman for the working class, the editorial asserted that "the working class realizes that at a time when there are those who are conducting activities opposed to the socialist system and to the leadership of the Communist party, the most important thing is to unite as one and defeat these attacks."

Another appeared in the People's Daily two days later entitled "On the Socialist Foundation, People of the Whole Country Unite!" This began on a somewhat defensive note. In the words of Peiping radio, "the editorial emphatically points out that to follow the socialist path without the leadership of the working class and the Communist party is unimaginable." The editorial then recalled the various attempts of certain rightist elements to take advantage of the rectification movement to oppose socialism and undermine socialist undertakings. These rightist elements, the editorial said, were a small remnant which evidently hoped that its opinions would receive support from private industrial and commercial circles. In prescribing a course of action to be pursued under these circumstances, the editorial called for efforts clearly to distinguish between those people who support socialism but who harbor certain temporary doubts, uncertainties, and reservations because of their temporary failure to conform to changes, and rightists who are hostile to the socialist system. The editorial concludes that "all those who are truly patriotic and who are willing to stand on the side of socialism should, therefore, draw a line of demarcation between themselves and the rightists, so as to gain a clearer understanding of questions regarding right and wrong." As for the rightists themselves, "they have also finally come to realize that unless they fundamentally change their attitude toward socialism they will become an utterly isolated, pitiable group. In other words they will be thrown out of the train of the times."

The following day, the People's Daily carried its final editorial of the series on the alleged "rightist" attack on Communist leadership and the principles of socialism as interpreted by the Chinese Communist party. In this editorial the leaders of the Communist party apparently attempted to prevent the rectification campaign from becoming entirely displaced by the antirightist campaign. Speaking for the Communist party,

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the editorial emphatically pointed out that "we must bravely accept all correct criticism and promptly take measures to correct all defects and mistakes in work." In conclusion, the editorial said that "regardless of the attempt by a small number of rightists to disrupt our rectification movement with their destructive opinions, we must carry out the rectification movement." It added that the Communist party must continue to enlist the aid of the masses outside the party in the rectification campaign.

Mao Takes a Hard Line, June 1957

With the Chinese Communist party's counterattack on its critics well under way as a result of a series of editorials published by the People's Daily, the next major step in the anti-rightist campaign was taken. This was the publication on 18 June 1957 of an official "text" of Mao Tse-tung's February speech "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People." According to an introductory note, "The author has gone over the text based on the verbatim record and made certain additions." These "additions" somehow resulted in a text that was much shorter than the original speech. Since portions of the published text were undoubtedly added as a result of "rightist" attacks, there must also have been very substantial deletions from the speech as originally delivered.

During the months between Mao's delivery of the speech and its publication, lengthy commentaries on its content appeared in the People's Daily and elsewhere. From these commentaries and various direct and indirect quotations it is possible to form a fairly accurate idea of the general import of the speech. On the basis of this picture of the speech as originally presented, it is almost certain that the published text went beyond the original speech in setting limits to free expression of opinions. As far as the rectification campaign is concerned, the principal changes in the published version occurred, as might be expected, in those sections dealing with the definition of contradictions, the application of the "hundred flowers" and "mutual supervision" policies, and the avoidance of waste.

In the opening paragraphs of the June version there appears a definition of "the people" which permitted the regime to judge arbitrarily who might exercise the rights guaranteed by the Chinese Communist constitution. It thus provides a doctrinal basis for confinement of the regime's tolerance to those who serve its ends:

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At this stage of building socialism, all classes, strata and social groups which approve, support, and work for the cause of socialist construction belong to the category of the people, while those social forces and groups which resist the socialist revolution, and are hostile to and try to wreck socialist construction, are enemies of the people.

In his general discussion of contradictions, Mao offered the example of the 1942 rectification campaign and the "unity--criticism--unity" formulas as the correct method for resolving contradictions among the people. "In 1942," he said, "we used this method to resolve contradictions inside the Communist party, namely, contradictions between the doctrinaires and the rank-and-file membership." As has been pointed out, this view was consistent with the emphasis of the introductory statements which preceded the new campaign, i.e., rectification was to be strictly a Communist party affair in which nonparty people might assist if they wished. In the June text, however, this view was apparently qualified with additional remarks.

This apparent modification was introduced by an abrupt statement that "we extended this method beyond our party." It was then argued that during the anti-Japanese war the rectification formula had been "used very successfully to deal with relations between those in positions of leadership and the masses, between the army and the civilian population, between officers and men." It was even claimed that the method had been used since 1927 to deal with relations between the Communist party and the masses and "in general with relations among the people."

This portion of the published speech concluded with a definition of future tasks which portended the extension of the rectification campaign beyond the Communist party:

Now our task is to continue to extend and make still better use of this method throughout the ranks of the people; we want all our factories, cooperatives, business establishments, schools, government offices, public bodies, in a word, all the six hundred million of our people, to use it in resolving contradictions among themselves.

This statement heralded a fundamental change in the nature of the rectification campaign. It was the beginning of a movement which was to carry rectification to all sectors

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and all levels of Chinese society. Because of the size and complexity of the task thus undertaken, the campaign was initiated at different times and carried out to varying degrees in various parts of the country; eventually, however, it penetrated, in one form or another, to the most remote areas and to the lowest levels of society.

The heart of the new restrictions placed on free expression in the revised text of Mao's speech occurred in the section on the "hundred flowers" and "long-term coexistence and mutual supervision" policies. In discussing distinctions between "fragrant flowers" and "poisonous weeds," Mao presented a list of six criteria:

We believe that, broadly speaking, words and actions can be judged right if they:

- 1) Help to unite the people of our various nationalities, and do not divide them;
- 2) Are beneficial, not harmful to socialist transformation and socialist construction;
- 3) Help to consolidate, not undermine or weaken, the people's democratic dictatorship;
- 4) Help to consolidate, not undermine or weaken, democratic centralism;
- 5) Tend to strengthen, not to cast off or weaken, the leadership of the Communist party;
- 6) Are beneficial, not harmful, to international socialist solidarity and the solidarity of the peace-loving peoples of the world.

Mao admitted that these were political criteria but defended their inclusion in a discussion of a policy that applied to the arts and sciences. They were necessary, he said, in addition to other criteria for judging the worth of scientific or artistic activities: "In a socialist country like ours, can there possibly be any useful scientific or artistic activity which runs counter to these political criteria?"

The June text proceeded to a discussion of the policy governing relations between the Chinese Communist party and the "democratic" puppet parties which had been summed up in

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the slogan: "long-term coexistence and mutual supervision." The slogan was presented in somewhat defensive terms. In the words of the published text: "The idea of long-term coexistence had been in existence for a long time, but last year when the socialist system was basically established, the slogan was set out in clear terms." The origin of the policy was traced back as far as a statement made by Mao in 1950.

Mao, in the June text, commented on the value of outside criticism and expressed the wish that it be continued. The published version of the speech, however, left no doubt that the survival of the non-Communist parties was dependent on their observance of the six criteria previously presented:

Of course, advice and criticism exchanged between the Communist party and the other democratic parties will play a positive role in mutual supervision only when they conform to the six political criteria given above. That is why we hope that the other democratic parties will all pay attention to ideological remoulding, and strive for long-term coexistence and mutual supervision with the Communist party so as to meet the needs of the new society.

This was a far cry from the calls for criticism which had been issued only a few weeks previously. The earlier invitations had evidently been based on an assumption that "ideological remoulding" had already taken place among prominent non-Communists to such an extent that they could be trusted to offer mild and perhaps even salutary criticism of the Communist party. When it had become apparent by mid-June that this assumption was wrong, the publication of a revised version of Mao's February speech provided a means of reimposing stringent limits on the freedom to criticize.

Throughout the June version of the speech there occur statements which contrast with assertions made during the introductory phases of the rectification campaign. It seems likely that these statements had been inserted in order to counteract the overoptimistic mood in which the campaign had been conceived. In the section on the suppression of counter-revolution, for example, Mao is reported to have said that "even when all the counterrevolutionaries in existence have been rooted out, new ones may emerge. If we drop our guard we shall be badly fooled and suffer for it severely." This has the appearance of a hedge on the earlier insistence that counterrevolutionaries had been "basically eliminated."

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It was also claimed in many statements that preceded the rectification campaign that classes had been "basically wiped out." This would seem to imply the virtual elimination of class struggle. The June text of Mao's speech, however, stresses the role still to be played by the class struggle:

But remnants of the overthrown landlord and comprador classes still exist, the bourgeoisie still exists, and the petty bourgeoisie has only just begun to remould itself. Class struggle is not yet over. The class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the class struggle between various political forces, and the class struggle in the ideological field between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie will still be long and devious and at times may even become very acute.

In its reaffirmation of earlier points as well as in its obvious revisions, the published text of Mao's speech charted the future course of the rectification campaign. The June version linked rectification with the task of "socialist construction" and strongly urged "all the 600 million people of our country" to increase production, practice economy, and combat extravagance. In the months to follow, this aspect of the rectification campaign achieved the status of a major nationwide campaign in its own right. After publication of the speech, it was the "official" text rather than the original version that became the basis of the rectification campaign.

#### Others Echo Hard Line, June-July 1957

A week after the publication of Mao's speech on contradictions, the National People's Congress opened its fourth session in Peiping on 25 June 1957. The congress had been twice postponed and was preceded by an unusual "preparatory meeting" at which, presumably, the proceedings of the forthcoming session were carefully laid out. Both the delays and the preparatory meeting probably were occasioned by the need to allow delegates time to study carefully the official text of Mao's speech and to acquaint those from distant places with other shifts in a rapidly changing line. Party leaders may have feared that too much of the spirit of free criticism which had prevailed a month earlier might otherwise have persisted into the Congress session and proved embarrassing.

The keynote speech to the congress was delivered by Chou En-lai in the form of a "Report on the Work of the Government."

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Although it dealt largely with economic and administrative matters, the speech was studded throughout with statements in defense of previous measures of the regime and attempts to correct the impression of tolerance of real criticism which had been created during the opening phases of the rectification movement. In line with the People's Daily editorials of early June and the official text of Mao's speech, Chou also attempted to correct the overoptimistic assessment of the docility of nonparty people which underlay the party's solicitation of outside criticism.

In the course of a review of the events of the past few years, Chou admitted that mistakes had been made during the "socialist transformation" of agriculture, handicrafts, industry and commerce. He blamed these mistakes largely on the mass nature of the movements and claimed that the errors had been outweighed by the achievements attained. As for those who had been unjustly harmed, however, "we should apologize publicly to those people who suffered unnecessarily in the movement."

Chou reiterated earlier optimistic estimates of the status of the revolution but emphasized the continuing role of the class struggle:

When we say that the socialist revolution has triumphed in the main and that the turbulent class struggle waged by the masses on a large scale has, in the main, been concluded, we do not mean to say that class struggle has ended. When we now bring to the fore the question of correctly handling contradictions among the people, we do not mean to say that there are no longer contradictions between ourselves and the enemy.

Chou attacked critics of the regime in terms that left little doubt as to the point at which their criticism had overstepped the bounds of tolerance:

Certain right-wing elements have come out with quite a number of utterances of a destructive nature, on the pretense of helping the Communist party with its rectification campaign. Not a few such views aimed directly against the basic state system of our country.

What these critics were really trying to do, Chou said, was "to get our state power away from the vanguard of the

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working class--away from the leadership of the Communist party." In defending the Chinese Communist party's monopoly of power, Chou cited the 1954 constitution which acknowledges the party's leadership. He also presented one of the Communists' favorite circular arguments, that the leadership of the party is necessary in order to "build socialism" and thus attain "the world of universal harmony of which the Chinese people have always dreamed."

Finally, Chou reinterpreted the policy of "long-term co-existence and mutual supervision" so as to leave no doubt about the future role of the puppet parties and the terms on which they would be permitted to survive. He paid lip-service to the importance of the "united front" but affirmed that "the Communist party is the guiding force and the core of the united front and the common goal of struggle for the people of the entire country." As for the function of the united front:

Through the various democratic parties and groups and people's organizations brought together in the united front, it is possible to do better education in socialist ideology, more effectively carry through socialist transformation, and advance the cause of socialist construction. This is the function and purpose of the policy put forward by the Communist party for long-term coexistence with the democratic parties and mutual supervision. What the people expect of the democratic parties is that they should firmly adhere to the socialist stand and pay attention to ideological remolding so that they can play a positive role in state affairs to the fullest extent of their capabilities.

In the unlikely event that any delegates had failed to appreciate any of the points made by Chou En-lai, they were repeated and underscored in a speech by the party's propaganda chief, Lu Ting-i, on 11 July 1957. Lu's long and detailed article in the People's Daily in March had heralded the rectification campaign.

Like Chou, Lu began on a defensive note. Some rightists, he said, attributed the rectification campaign to insuperable difficulties which confronted the Chinese Communist party. These rightists were quoted as having said that the Communists had made mistakes in every field and that the country was in utter darkness. On the contrary, Lu said, the rectification campaign had been made possible by the decisive victory of the socialist revolution, and because, "in the course of the

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struggle for this victory, democratic parties and groups, the national bourgeoisie, and the intellectuals had generally accepted or agreed to the socialist revolution." He claimed that "the overwhelming majority of the people see the campaign and the policies of the party from the standpoint of love for the country and socialism."

Why, then, had the antirightist campaign become necessary? Because, said Lu, "a very few bourgeois rightists think that the moment has come for an upheaval and that a great offensive can be launched against socialism, against the people's democratic system, and against the Communist party."

Lu especially attacked rightist attempts to provoke students to carry out disturbances. He accused them of planning to use students as the spearhead of a movement which would eventually attract workers and others and provide a pretext for a rightist offer to settle the disturbed situation. Lu charged that the non-Communist minister of communications, Chang Po-chun, had connived at such a plan during a talk with six professors a few weeks earlier. One of the six, Lu said, was the vice minister of higher education. Lu was referring obliquely to a sizable student demonstration which had taken place in Wuhan about a month before his speech. Chang was later accused directly of having been involved in inciting this demonstration.

The schemes of the rightists failed, according to Lu, because they over-estimated their forces. He claimed that a maximum of 1 to 3 percent of the students in higher institutions had supported and followed the rightists and that of these a mere handful remained. Although the rightists had centered their hopes on the higher intellectuals, Lu said, they had won the support of only a small percentage, most of whom had already forsaken them.

Lu also charged that the rightists had expected help from the capitalists but had only evoked a few scattered echoes. The "democratic" parties also had failed to respond to rightist overtures, Lu said, and many of them had decided to carry out their own rectification campaigns. He thus acknowledged the services of the many non-Communist delegates who had risen to accuse their colleagues of "rightist" tendencies.

Lu also made it clear that the single standard by which any utterance would be judged was adherence to Communist goals and methods:

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To reject socialism, to reject the leadership of the working class, to reject the people's democratic dictatorship and democratic centralism, and to reject the alliance with the Soviet Union can only destroy our country. What the rightists stand for is exactly what will destroy our country and lead us to annihilation.

In discussing the class struggle, Lu reversed the emphasis of his earlier article: "The exploiting classes have basically been eliminated and the period of large-scale class struggle is over. But this certainly does not mean that there is no class struggle in a socialist society." He further asserted that this struggle "will sometimes assume a very active form."

Lu Ting-i concluded his speech with a reaffirmation of the Communist party's liberalization programs and urged "bold encouragement of criticism and self-criticism to correct the shortcomings and mistakes in our work." He made it clear, however, that liberalization and criticism of the regime would be allowed to survive in name alone: "The rightists must be mercilessly criticized and the rectification campaign must be resolutely continued."

A final feature of the National People's Congress session was the delivery of a number of abject confessions, spoken and written, by prominent nonparty personages who had come in for criticism as rightists. These included the three ministerial officials who had been especially sharply criticized at the meeting. More than six months were to pass, however, before they were formally dismissed from their posts.

The Communist leadership's concern over the political situation among students was again demonstrated on the day following adjournment of the National People's Congress. On 16 July 1957, both Chou En-lai and Peng Chen, a politburo member and mayor of Peiping, addressed a meeting of 12,000 1957 graduates of institutes of higher education in Peiping. Chou exhorted the graduates to work in the interest of the state and society rather than seeking their own pleasure. He told them that he had high hopes for them and noted with satisfaction that most graduates of institutes of higher learning had been "stepped" in the recent political struggle against rightists and that they had conducted themselves properly. Chou expressed the hope that the graduates, after leaving school, would continue to reform and temper themselves through political struggle and also through participation in physical labor.

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The tone of Chou's talk to the graduates was not at all conciliatory. Apparently the student disturbances during the summer had not disposed the regime to make concessions to student groups as a means of placating them. Chou did not even hold out the hope of a future reward. To build China into a highly industrialized and advanced nation, he said, was a task that would require several decades. To the students, as to other segments of Chinese society, the leadership presented an appearance of bland confidence that, except for a few malcontents, the populace would be happy to devote their lives to the aims provided for them by the Chinese Communist party.

Peng Chen lectured the graduates on the important educational significance of the antirightist struggle and called on his hearers to associate closely with workers and peasants, to respect them and learn from them, and to comply with the work assignment given them by the state. Peng maintained that the great majority of students had been able to distinguish right from wrong during the antirightist struggle because of the guidance of the Communist party and their teachers. He hoped that students who had committed mistakes in the course of the campaign "would resolutely correct them and would follow the path to socialist construction and socialist transformation."

The unyielding line taken by Chou and Peng in their addresses to the graduates was confirmed by a State Council directive issued the following day which required stringent political investigation of all graduating classes. Students whose attitudes were not acceptable would be placed on probation for periods of up to three years during which they would perform menial tasks while undergoing "ideological correction." The authorities avoided violent measures for the time being but some erring students were forced to forego their summer holidays in order to undertake special ideological studies.

By late July the antirightist campaign had reached into the Communist party itself and a number of party members in journalism and publishing activities had been condemned for their criticism of party cadres. A basis for this phase of the campaign was provided by a People's Daily editorial of 28 July. The editorial began with a justification of the antirightist campaign on the grounds that it would be "impossible to consolidate socialist undertakings if the revolution is under way only in the aspect of ownership of production means without corresponding progress on the political and ideological fronts." In order to carry out the political

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and ideological revolution, the editorial said, "everyone must go through the gate of socialism."

Communist party members would not be automatically assumed to be above question in these matters; the editorial asserted that for each party member, "the attitude to adopt with regard to this struggle is a significant political test since every party member, too, must go through this gate of socialism." The editorial pointed out the seriousness of the situation:

Certain well-intentioned comrades seemed to be of the opinion that the rightists existed only outside of the party, and only among the bourgeoisie, democratic parties, and the intellectuals who had never reformed themselves. This view, however, is not in keeping with the facts, for the antirightist struggle under way in various areas has exposed many rightists within the party.

In the heat of the fierce battle between the Chinese bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the editorial said, the rightists within the party began to show their true faces: "They joined rightists outside the party and took advantage of certain individual and scattered shortcomings and defects in party and state life to launch an attack against the party from within and without." The editorial said that, under these circumstances, "in order to protect the party from rightist corruption and to maintain the ideological and political purity of the party, it is necessary to develop an 'impartial and equal' struggle against the rightists within and without the party."

The People's Daily editorial cautioned, however, that "oversimplified and impetuous methods" should not be used against the rightists. Instead, the rightists were to be isolated by persuasion and criticism. Party members were also warned never to make false charges against nonrightists.

On the day after the publication of the People's Daily editorial on rightists within the Communist party, the Kwang Ming Daily, mouthpiece of the "democratic" parties, carried an editorial entitled, "Why Is It Necessary for Democratic Parties to Launch an Antirightist Struggle?" The editorial pointed out that the events in the course of the antirightist campaign of the past month had vividly proved that the struggle was of key significance to the puppet parties. These parties were warned that they must go through this struggle to "clarify their stands." In case there should remain any

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misunderstanding on the part of members of the puppet parties, they were told explicitly that this was a matter of life and death for the parties.

Thus, by the end of July 1958, the rectification campaign which had begun as a Communist party movement had been extended to the ranks of the non-Communist political parties, while the antirightist campaign which had at first involved non-Communists had been extended into the Communist party. The two campaigns, however, had not yet been formally merged. During the next few weeks, the antirightist campaign increased in scope and intensity while the rectification campaign was completely refashioned.

"Antirightist Struggle" Continues, August 1957

In an apparent move to intensify the campaign against opponents of the regime, Chinese Communist authorities gave increasing publicity to the capture of alleged conspiratorial bands in widely separated parts of the mainland during late July and August 1957. After several bands had been broken up, a link was established between such counterrevolutionary activity and certain accused rightists. The leaders of a band reportedly seized in the Hupeh-Hunan border area were quoted as declaring that Minister of Communications Chang Po-chun and Chu An-ping, former chief editor of the "democratic" parties' Kwang Ming Daily, "belonged to their group." Another non-Communist official who had criticized the regime, Minister of Timber Industry Lo Lung-chi, was accused of having formed an alliance with Chang which had been responsible for the two-day student riot in the city of Wuhan in June. By associating these men with counterrevolutionary activity--most heinous crime in the Communist code--Communist authorities undoubtedly hoped to discourage other potentially disaffected intellectuals and bureaucrats from openly expressing opposition.

Another cause for concern on the part of Chinese Communist leaders during the late summer of 1957 was the lagging grain procurement program in rural areas. The People's Daily in early August declared that the food question was primarily an ideological problem. Three days later, the CCP central committee ordered immediate action by all levels of the party to give the peasants a "true appreciation" of the superiority of cooperatives, the necessity for government purchasing and marketing of grain, the nature of the relationship between urban workers and peasants, and the importance of suppressing counterrevolutionaries. The directive linked the situation

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among the peasants with the antirightist campaign and declared that "reactionaries and counterrevolutionaries" who raised their voices were to be silenced at once. This was followed by another long editorial in the People's Daily explaining the party line put forth in the directive.

High-level officials of the Chinese Communist party continued to take advantage of every possible occasion to promote the antirightist and rectification campaigns. The emphasis was still on the antirightist phase. On 4 August, politburo member Peng Chen, mayor of Peiping, addressed a meeting of the Peiping People's Congress. The purpose of the meeting, Peng said, was "to expose further and criticize the reactionary heresies of the bourgeois rightists (and) to give impetus to the progress of the rectification campaign." Peng characterized the antirightist struggle:

It is a great debate of the whole people, a great political and ideological battle, a struggle between capitalism and socialism; it is also a struggle which concerns the destiny of the 600,000,000 people and the social development of our country, and a struggle of great historical and international significance. Socialism will not triumph if we do not win this battle.

The term "great debate" quickly became part of the jargon of the antirightist and rectification campaigns. Apparently the authorities, in order to maintain a semblance of the abandoned liberalization policies, sanctioned the use of the word "debate" once it had been clearly established that no real debate would be permitted. The so-called debates that were organized throughout the country from this time onward served no purpose but to propagandize and justify the policies of the regime.

Peng Chen went on to advise the rightists "obediently to lay down their arms, raise their hands, express their determination to repent, and truthfully confess their crimes. If an early effort is made, they can still expect to be saved." Peng then proceeded to refute rightist charges that the regime had made "a mess" of the country. He admitted mistakes and shortcomings, "some of which are of a very serious nature," but contended that these were "incomparably insignificant when compared with the successes achieved."

Although his primary stress was on the antirightist campaign, Peng also called the attention of his audience to the general aims of his rectification campaign. According to press

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reports of his speech, he pointed out the main mistakes and shortcomings of certain leading and working cadres, both Communist and non-Communist, and criticized their work and their working style. He was further reported to have pointed out that "such mistakes and shortcomings were also perpetrated by our leadership." The names of the individuals whom Peng criticized were not reported but their shortcomings were described in some detail. These faults were, for the most part, those which had been singled out for criticism during the introductory phases of the rectification campaign.

Peng urged that everyone diligently labor at the type of work for which he was best suited. In keeping with earlier directives on rectification, he recommended that cadres do a certain amount of manual work. Peng also proposed a measure that was put into effect amidst a great deal of publicity during the following months:

In the future, 30 to 50 percent of the working personnel of government offices and administrative personnel of productive and nonproductive enterprises should be dispatched to workshops, stores, farms, agricultural cooperatives, handicraftmen's cooperatives, and other basic-level units to participate in productive labor and basic-level work for a comparatively long period.

On 15 August, a preparatory conference for another people's congress meeting, in Shanghai, provided an opportunity for Ko Ching-shih, secretary of the East China bureau of the Chinese Communist party, to promote the antirightist and rectification campaigns. Twelve days later, a lengthy resumé of Ko's speech was published in the People's Daily, a significant indication of high-level endorsement of his views.

Ko began with the familiar assertion that the rectification campaign and the antirightist struggle constituted a socialist revolution on the political and ideological fronts which had become necessary after completion of the revolution in regard to ownership of the means of production. Ko's discussion of the two campaigns followed lines that had already been laid down but his treatment was fresher and less cliché-ridden than were most other statements on the subject.

Ko credited "the party's central committee and Chairman Mao Tse-tung" with having devised a series of policies which would solve internal questions among the people and bring into full play the energetic initiative of the masses in building socialism. The party, he said, had started the rectification campaign in order to be better able to cope with the new

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situation and unite all the forces that could be united to serve in building socialism. Ko maintained that these policies would be carried out by democratic methods and persuasion rather than coercion.

Ko succinctly summed up the aims of rectification:

Our objective is to create a political situation in which there is both centralism and democracy, both discipline and freedom, both united will and personal ease of mind, and vitality to serve the interests of the socialist revolution and socialist construction. This will make it easier to overcome difficulties and build China's modern industry and agriculture more rapidly. Also the party and the state will be more consolidated and more capable of weathering storms. This is the conclusion which our party drew by summing up considerable historical experience.

Ko reaffirmed the validity of the liberalization policies as "guiding principles" for the rectification campaign. These policies, he said, "certainly will not be stopped half way because of the struggle against the rightists." Ko asserted that the struggle against the rightists was, in fact, for the purpose of creating conditions in which the rectification campaign could be carried out. It was apparent that Ko hoped to prevent the antirightist campaign from completely eclipsing the original rectification campaign. He assured his hearers that, "at the present moment, while the struggle against the rightists is going on, the party's rectification campaign is also continuing."

Ko repeated the claim that the number of rightists was actually very small but urged that the struggle be carried through to the end so as to secure complete victory. He described rectification and the antirightist campaign as "a nationwide public debate," on such questions as "whether our revolution and construction work were correct; whether we should follow the road to socialism; whether we wanted the leadership of the Communist party, the dictatorship of the proletariat and democratic centralism; and whether the foreign policy of this country was correct." By this time Ko was able to assume, apparently, that his listeners would be well aware that the answers to these questions had already been determined and that the "debates" would serve only to reaffirm them.

Ko made a transparent attempt to attribute to the rightists an error which had in fact been made by the Communists. The

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antirightist struggle, he said, had been instigated by the bourgeois rightists who had "made a wrong assessment of the whole situation." This interpretation of the campaign also "explained" the embarrassing fact that the Communists had been taken by surprise by the opposition expressed in the early phases of the rectification campaign.

On the day following Ko Ching-shih's speech, the People's Daily published an editorial which summed up the antirightist campaign, criticized its conduct by some units and cadres, and indicated that the campaign would be a long and thorough-going one. According to the editorial the antirightist struggle had been instituted only in the upper levels of the organizations concerned:

The antirightist struggle which was started in early June has been going on for more than two months now. At present, the top-level organizations of the central government, the various provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions are all broadening this struggle. This struggle is also being developed gradually among the top-level organizations of special administrative areas, hsien, and urban areas, as well as in major factories, mines, middle schools, and industrial and commercial circles.

The development of the antirightist campaign, however, had been "uneven," the editorial said. This was attributed "not only to the difference of time in starting this struggle by different units, but also to the difference in the seriousness of the leadership and the extent of the work being carried out." The directors of some units were even charged with having "wanted perfunctorily to close the issue at an early date." Thus notice was served on the party leadership at all levels that the energetic pursuit of the antirightist campaign would be their primary duty. "In many cases," the editorial said, "the lack of greater development of the antirightist struggle is caused by the principal responsible cadres of the units concerned who failed to assume a serious responsible attitude in this matter."

The editorial presented the familiar arguments in justification of the antirightist campaign and described the struggle as one "on which the destiny of our country hinges and one concerning the life or death of the cause of socialism." In conclusion, the editorial referred to the antirightist campaign and socialist construction as "currently two central tasks of our country which must be considered as being of

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equal importance." The editorial failed to mention the rectification campaign.

The promotion of the antirightist campaign continued during this period at a meeting of "teachers of Marxism-Leninism" at Peiping. This meeting was addressed by the Chinese Communist party's propaganda chief Lu Ting-i and by politburo alternate Kang Sheng whose public activities since 1956 have dealt largely with educational matters. Lu Ting-i addressed the more than 5,600 persons at the meeting on the "situation and significance of the current antirightist struggle and the rectification movement, and called on teachers of Marxism-Leninism and other intellectuals to become intellectuals of the working class." Lu stressed the need to create a working-class intelligentsia, as had Liu Shao-chi at the eighth congress of the CCP the previous September.

Kang Sheng devoted major attention to the general problems of teaching Marxism-Leninism and to methods of carrying on the antirightist and rectification campaigns in educational institutions. The "violent phase of the counterattack against the rightists" had already taken place in most of the educational institutes throughout the country, he said, and the "upsurge in the large-scale mass struggle to repel the rightist attack had ended." Kang cautioned his hearers, however, that the rectification movement and the antirightist struggle had not yet been concluded.

Taking the line of the People's Daily, Kang Sheng said that the intensity and the scope of the antirightist struggle had been uneven among the various schools. To cope with this problem, Kang said, the propaganda department of the CCP central committee, the Ministry of Higher Education, and other agencies concerned had decided that political education would be made a part of the formal curriculum of all schools in addition to continuing as a major extracurricular activity. Kang described the nature of the new course:

This course is of the nature of class education in the socialist revolutionary movement. It must not be regarded as an ordinary course in the general curriculum. This is a course of the rectification movement and socialist education and a component part of the great all-people debate."

It is apparent from the remarks of Lu and Kang that the regime was answering student discontent with increased attempts at indoctrination, and discontent among intellectuals with a

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re-emphasis on the creation of a body of new intellectuals rather than the "remolding" of existing ones.

Public statements on the two campaigns continued to urge the use of reasoning and persuasion in order to convert people who exhibited rightist tendencies. In the case of students, however, one of the rare instances of intimidation by bloodier methods occurred in early September. On 6 September 1957, the Chinese Communist press announced that three ring-leaders of the student riot at Wuhan in June had been executed on that day. The announcement was obviously timed to coincide with the opening of the academic year so as to have the maximum effect on returning students. Others involved in the riot were given sentences ranging from 5 to 15 years.

By early September, three months after it had begun in an atmosphere of surprise and haste, the antirightist campaign had been formalized, channeled, and provided with its own vocabulary of "newspeak" jargon. During these three months the rectification campaign almost disappeared in the welter of speeches, articles, and editorials on the struggle against the rightists. The two campaigns had been treated as complementary but separate throughout this period. By September, however, the leadership apparently decided that the antirightist campaign had progressed to the extent that more attention could be directed safely to some of the original goals of the rectification campaign, as Ko Ching-shih had hinted three weeks previously. Further developments during the month of September 1957, therefore, were to open a new phase in the course of the rectification campaign.

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III.

Rectification Reoriented

By the end of August 1957, the Chinese Communist leaders had apparently decided that the "antirightist" opposition, which had risen so vigorously in response to the party's bid for criticism, had been brought sufficiently under control that the rectification campaign could return partially to its original aims and methods. The unexpected events of the summer, however, had forced changes in the campaign which were in some respects fundamental. During September the new direction of the movement was clearly pointed out to members of the non-Communist parties as well as to the rank and file of the Chinese Communist party.

A People's Daily editorial on 5 September 1957 both rationalized the surprises of the early weeks of the campaign and presented the official outline of the coming phases. The most conspicuous new feature of the revised campaign was that it would combine the original rectification movement with the antirightist movement which had so unexpectedly interrupted it. In addition, the campaign was greatly enlarged in scope. In the words of the editorial: "The rectification movement of the party and the struggle waged by the masses against bourgeois rightists now are undergoing expansion to become a rectification movement of all the people."

The editorial maintained that in addition to the anti-rightist struggle, a "great mass debate" would be developed among all groups to examine "fundamental questions concerning the socialist revolution and the socialist construction" of the country. This description of the high-pressure propaganda campaign to wipe out all overt opposition to the aims of the regime became standard throughout the remainder of rectification.

The "rectification movement of all the people" had two major goals, according to the People's Daily editorial. One goal was to "enable" the bourgeoisie, bourgeois intellectuals, and the petty bourgeoisie to "accept socialist transformation and to tread the socialist path." The working class and the "essential column of the Communist party," on the other hand, were to rectify working styles and overcome bureaucratism, subjectivism, and sectarianism. The editorial admitted that these questions were different in nature but justified their inclusion in a single campaign on the grounds that the same

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methods--"criticism and self-criticism, and the great mass debate by reasoning through facts"--were to be used in each case.

The editorial recounted the gains made by the party in enabling "many people to raise their political consciousness considerably within such a short period of time." This did not mean, however, that there would be no further obstacles in the path of the rectification campaign. "Even now," the editorial said, "there are still many comrades who are skeptical regarding development of the great mass debate in factories and rural areas." These party members were described as fearing exposure and criticism by the masses and arousing rightists or "backward elements."

To comfort those who harbored these fears, the editorial put forward the official fiction that the reaction to the opening of the rectification campaign was due entirely to "those smug rightists who were promptly surrounded by the masses and who suffered attacks launched from all sides and quarters." This reaction had been only a temporary phenomenon, according to the editorial; during the "struggle to repel the rightists," the rightists themselves "gradually realized their own mistakes and now stand at the side of the masses." This turn of events, the editorial stated, "serves to illustrate that the correctness of our undertaking is unquestionable." The editorial asserted that the "broad masses have resolutely accepted Communist party leadership and have chosen the socialist path." Shameful defeat was said to lie in store for anyone who attempted to resist this "will of the broad masses."

Somewhat inconsistently, the editorial also extolled the advantages of "the turbulence of revolutionary struggle" and maintained that the struggle against "wrong, reactionary words and deeds" provided cadres and the masses with the best education and training. Alluding to the "hundred flowers" slogan, the editorial pointed out that "flowers which are cultivated in a hot house, free from wind and rain, may be fresh and pretty, but they are not possessed of much vitality." Thus the Chinese Communist party's official newspaper trod the narrow line between the insistence that all was peaceful and stable and the need to predict and oppose further struggle.

The editorial then turned to a discussion of the great "mass debates" to be undertaken throughout the country. Cadres

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were urged to form the habit "of relying on the masses and consulting the masses when anything comes up." Criticism should be welcomed, the editorial said, because "the honest and open criticism of others creates a favorable objective condition for one to rectify his shortcomings and mistakes and effectively insures that he will push ahead and improve his work."

In a further attempt to encourage apprehensive cadres, the editorial made some unusually frank comments on rectification in the armed forces. "Even in the people's army, the possessors of weapons," it said, "the party has carried out military, political, and economic democratization to a certain extent and under centralized guidance." As a result of these moves, the editorial continued, relations between officers and soldiers and between the army and the people had become very close, and the morale of the troops was high.

The editorial pointed out the applicability of this situation to the over-all rectification movement: "Since this method can be adopted even in the army, why can it not be implemented in the factories and rural areas? How is it possible for Communist party members to fear their own flesh-and-blood relations, the Chinese people, when they are not even afraid of the imperialist reactionaries?" This question throws a rare and revealing light on the actual relations between the party rank and file and the populace whom they are supposed to cherish and assist.

In the event that any reader should be so obtuse as to fail to appreciate the line laid down, the editorial closed with an explicit warning against a literal interpretation of current propaganda:

Of course, reliance upon the strength of the masses and the solution of problems through mass debate do not mean abandonment of leadership, abandonment of democratic centralization, and abandonment of labor and political discipline. On the contrary, the very purpose of debate is to strengthen leadership, centralization, and discipline--not to weaken them. Even in the course of debate, there is absolute necessity to observe definite centralization and discipline, and any act that will jeopardize production or create anarchy will not be permitted. Furthermore, discussions and debate must be conducted under proper leadership and in a systematic and planned manner.

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Even the party's alleged reliance on the wisdom of the people was subjected to qualification by the editorial:

We cannot expect the people to understand the truth of all things all by themselves. Therefore it is natural for them to express erroneous opinions or be temporarily swayed by erroneous opinions. However, if only we strengthen leadership instead of abandoning leadership, find how to educate the masses with their own personal experiences, and actively help the masses understand the over-all truth, the great majority of the people will undoubtedly stand on the correct side after holding discussions and debate.

Four months after the opening of the rectification campaign, the editorial admitted that "many" cadres below the provincial level were still not familiar with the nature and importance of the party's mass line. The editorial all too accurately forecast the character of the propaganda output over the following months: "In order to familiarize the cadres with the mass line, there is need to discuss it over and over again. After correctly solving a number of questions, the results should be carefully summarized and extensively publicized." In an unwitting commentary on Communist propaganda technique, the editorial then remarked that "after a time, the people will consider this a routine procedure."

The People's Daily editorial of 5 September 1957 dealt largely with the problems of relations between party members, especially cadres, and the nonparty masses. On 11 September another editorial appeared on the question of "rightists" within the party itself. Entitled "Handle Innerparty Rightists Sternly," the editorial proposed to advance one step further the discussions on the matter which the newspaper had initiated on 28 July.

Most of the innerparty rightists, it was claimed, had joined the party "at about the time of the nationwide liberation" (i.e. 1949). The paper admitted, however, that "there are also many of them who are veteran party members of 10 or 20 years." In spite of the presence of these traitors within the ranks, the party was assured that "the overwhelming majority of our party members, especially the overwhelming

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majority of our veteran party members, have...been willing to serve as staunch fighters for Communism."

The problem of innerparty rightists would always exist, the editorial said, because however strict the selection of members, "there would always be individual class dissidents and opportunists who would succeed in sneaking into the party." As for those already in the party, "there would also be certain party members, weak in will and vulnerable to corruption by bourgeois ideology, who would deteriorate and change their characteristics." These circumstances made it certain, according to the editorial, that in every revolutionary struggle there would always be a group of party members who would betray the party because their individual and class interests clashed with those of the revolution. Cadres were thus informed that their vigilance against betrayal from within could never be relaxed.

The major purpose of the editorial appeared in its accusation that "certain cadres" had taken the struggle against innerparty rightists much too lightly. Even worse, "after the party central authorities ascertained the characteristics of the rightists and the guiding principle of meting out the same treatment to them within and without the party, they would tend to tolerate and overlook those 'party members' whose political features are completely the same as the rightists outside of the party and would be reluctant to classify these persons as rightists." The particular fault of these cadres was that they "would wail and become tenderhearted over certain veteran party members who should have been classified as rightists."

Since there were no differences in the characteristics of rightists in or out of the party, the editorial said, "the presence of rightists within the party is even more dangerous to our party and revolutionary undertakings" than the existence of rightists outside the party. If the existence of rightists in the party should be tolerated, it was asserted, "these rightists will collude with rightists outside the party to attack and oppose us from within." These innerparty rightists were also considered more harmful because they could masquerade as party members and thus increase their "political capital" and more easily deceive the masses.

The editorial maintained that undue consideration for "party standing" was partly to blame for an excessively tolerant

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attitude toward innerparty rightists. The proper attitude, the editorial said, was quite the opposite since, "in view of their long standing in the party and the service they rendered, it is all the more expected" that those Communists would not make mistakes. "Being rightist is therefore an unforgivable state for them," the editorial maintained, and "they are not worthy of our pity." Readers were reminded that "we must realize that this party of ours is a revolutionary fighting organ, not a sentimental faction."

The editorial ended on a note of caution. It recommended that party members not be summarily classified as rightists. Only after the collection and analysis of evidence should such classification be made. The note of caution was nearly drowned out, however, by the exhortation to pursue the stern struggle against rightists.

In the same issue of People's Daily, an article by the Chinese Communist party's personnel chief, An Tzu-wen, also dealt with the question of innerparty rightists and other ideological weaklings. The majority of the members of the Communist party were proved resolute during the "blooming and contending" campaign and the antirightist struggle, An said. He stated, however, that these movements had also resulted in the exposure of "a portion of Communist party members whose stand is not firm, who are ideologically inclined toward the right; there is even a very small minority of these members who have betrayed the cause of the proletarian revolution."

The article proceeded to an analysis of the origins and motives of these innerparty rightists. It cautioned that social background does not determine everything about a party member, although members of nonproletarian origin should be subjected to especially close scrutiny. It was pointed out that party members from nonproletarian classes had, "in the absolute majority of cases, accepted Marxist-Leninist education, changed their original character, and become fighters of the proletariat--many of them having sacrificed their lives for the cause of the party and the people."

An explained the persistence of nonproletarian viewpoints as a result of the "peaceful" nature of the socialist revolution in China. He noted that:

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Precisely because the change of our economic foundation has been realized through peaceful means, and on the ideological and political fronts there has not been a fierce class struggle--that is to say, a thorough socialist revolution has not been carried out on the ideological and political fronts--those people who do not support, or even oppose, the socialist revolution still remain within the ranks of the revolution though their hearts are away from it. Though these people are inside the Communist party, they dream capitalist dreams.

This formulation, in addition to providing a rationalization for the continued presence of unregenerate Communists, linked the antirightist struggle with the rectification campaign, since the campaign had often been defined as "the socialist revolution on the political and ideological fronts."

An Tzu-wen made another contribution to the introduction of the "new" rectification campaign in the form of an article in the China Youth News of 20 September 1957. Entitled "Refutation of the Rightists on the Question of Cadres Policy," the article was a declaration of the necessity for political sophistication, as well as professional qualification, as a criterion for selecting cadres. The rightist criticism which the article purported to refute was that the Communist party selected cadres solely on the basis of political reliability and without regard to real talent. An accused the rightists of maintaining that political conditions should not be stressed during the period of construction and that the political status of cadres should not be considered. "Obviously, such a view is absurd," he wrote.

An's argument against this view was that "if one is reactionary politically, then the greater his 'talent,' the greater the harm to the people's cause. For his is not a 'talent' to serve the people but a 'talent' to oppose the people." An claimed that such cases had been numerous during the anti-rightist struggle.

Another rightist criticism attacked by An was the accusation that the Communist party was guilty of sectarianism in its insistence that the vast majority of cadres in all activities be party members. An countered this accusation with a simple and convenient redefinition of 'sectarianism' in such

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a way as to absolve the party of guilt. "Those who raise this question," he wrote, "confuse party leadership with sectarianism. If this state of affairs is represented and opposed as a manifestation of 'sectarianism,' it would amount to liquidation of the leadership of the working class and of the Communist party." An also adduced statements that the party was firmly opposed to sectarianism as evidence that it could not be accused of practising this sin.

An's article insisted on the fundamental importance of cadre policy as a factor bearing on the success or failure of the party's cause. Notice was served that the party would remain inflexible in this matter in the statement that "the working class and its political party will not waver on such an important question of principle." An's primary point--that cadres must be politically qualified as a prerequisite for responsibility--became a major tenet of rectification during its latter stages under the slogan "Red and Expert."

Members of the non-Communist "democratic parties," which had produced the most troublesome critics of the Chinese Communist party and its government during the opening phase of rectification, were also informed at this time of the official rationalization of the past summer's events and bluntly warned that compliance with the Communist party's program was the price of survival. This indoctrination was presented in a speech by Li Wei-han, chief of the United Front Work Department of the central committee of the Chinese Communist party. The speech was delivered on 15 September 1957 but was not published until 16 November, when it appeared in the Kwangming Daily--organ of the non-Communist puppet parties. It is likely that the speech as delivered was even more firm and uncompromising than the published version.

The topic of Li's speech was the "self-remolding" of the minor parties. Li began with the flat assertion that "all the democratic parties in China have always been and are still bourgeois political parties." They differed from ordinary bourgeois parties only in that they had accepted the leadership of the Communist party in 1948 and 1949, although their "social basis" remained the same. Measured by the six criteria laid down in Mao Tse-tung's speech on contradictions, Li said, the democratic parties contained "a small number of both leftists and rightists, with the great majority in the middle. Most of these middle-of-the-roaders, he said, were

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capable, "under the leadership of the Communist party, of continuing to accept socialist transformation and changing from a capitalist to a socialist standpoint. Indeed, a section of them now is almost leftist."

Li complained, however, that these non-Communist person-ages, even though impelled by the prevailing wind to move in the socialist direction, did not accept socialist transformation wholeheartedly. "Some even feel antagonistic," he exclaimed. This was a transitional state, Li said, and could not remain unchanged. The only possible course open to these bourgeois survivors was presented in unambiguous language: "As the tide of socialist revolution sweeps forward, it is wrong and indeed impossible to 'act cautiously to save one's skin,' to 'come to terms with the present,' or to 'straddle the fence.' There is only one way, and that is to accept socialist transformation actively."

The existence of bourgeois rightists among the membership of the minor parties was explained by Li as a result of the "high tide of socialist transformation" of 1955-56. Since that time, he said, "a bourgeois right wing gradually crystallized out among the bourgeois elements." This right wing, according to Li, reflected the stubborn opposition of a section of the capitalist class.

Li named three questions to be decided by the puppet parties. These, with their self-evident answers, were in effect a survival program for the non-Communist parties. The first question was "whether to follow the socialist road." Clearly, no doubt could remain as to the answer.

The second question involved the proper functions of the non-Communist parties while their members were undergoing socialist transformation. These parties, Li said, naturally represent the interests of the capitalist elements and bourgeois intellectuals who make up their membership. He granted that "during the period of socialist revolution, the various democratic parties must follow the laws of development of history and represent those interests and demands of capitalists and bourgeois intellectuals that are in keeping with the development of the socialist revolution." Primarily, Li said, the parties should represent the basic, long-term interests of their members by "helping them to accomplish

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socialist self-transformation, become masters of their own destiny, and look forward to a bright future." That is, they were to lead their members to total surrender to the Communist party.

The third question was "one of sincerity in accepting the leadership of the Communist party." Li remarked that this was "the fundamental principle for judging whether the democratic parties can proceed along the socialist road, gain the people's confidence, and permanently coexist with the Communist party." Li removed any lingering misunderstanding by making it absolutely explicit that the Communist party's slogan promising "coexistence and mutual supervision" in its relations with the minor parties did not include any implication of coleadership. The rightists, he said, had "wanted the democratic parties to challenge the power of the Communist party and share leadership with it." All in all, Li added, "the political line of the rightist drags the democratic parties into the abyss of counterrevolution."

Li Wei-han concluded his speech by laying down for his hearers the line by which they were to be guided during the remaining months of the rectification campaign:

This rectification campaign is a great socialist revolutionary movement, politically and ideologically. It is of great historical import. For all the democratic parties it is a severe test and a turning point in their fundamental transformation. It is necessary for all the democratic parties to go into the rectification campaign extensively and deeply, successfully pass this test, and lay a massive milestone on the route of their fundamental transformation.

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### Teng Hsiao-ping Keynotes New Campaign

The comments of the People's Daily, An Tzu-wen, and Li Wei-han on the subject of the course of the rectification campaign were, for the most part, addressed to specific audiences or concerned only with limited aspects of the campaign. The task of presenting a detailed, comprehensive, and authoritative statement on the shortcomings of rectification in the past and its proper course in the future was left to Teng Hsiao-ping, member of the standing committee of the Chinese Communist party's politburo and chief of the party's secretariat. The occasion for Teng's statement was the third enlarged plenary session of the eighth central committee of the party, which he addressed on 23 September 1957. This was the first plenary session of the central committee since November 1956, when Mao had announced that a formal rectification campaign would be instituted.

Teng began with comments on the general situation of the campaign. He described the spread of the campaign from party and government organs to the lowest strata of society. Teng reiterated the declaration of the People's Daily that the movement was to be broadened into a nationwide rectification. He cited the best possible authority for his remarks: "an overall appraisal of the nature and status of the rectification movement and the antirightist struggle, and clear-cut principles for the development of the movement" offered by Mao Tse-tung at a conference of "some provincial and municipal committee secretaries convened in July at Tsingtao." Teng added: "The nationwide movement is now developing successfully in compliance with the guiding principles of the central authorities."

Teng's opening comments dealt with the antirightist aspects of rectification. He pointed out that "the significance of this criticism against the capitalist rightists should not be underestimated," giving as a reason the fact that "the socialist revolution on the economic front alone in 1956--concerning the ownership of the means of production--is inadequate and not consolidated." Teng made enthusiastic use of the jargon which had developed in connection with rectification and the antirightist movement. He credited "the great national debate currently under way" with having solved some of the major questions concerning the correctness and importance of the Communist program.

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Although Teng claimed that "the development of the movement during the past four months and more has been fully compatible with the analysis by the central committee and Comrade Mao Tse-tung," his definition of the aims of rectification provided a concept of the movement that differed markedly from that presented during the introductory and early phases of the campaign. Teng said that "this movement aims at resolving two sorts of contradictions--contradictions between our enemies and ourselves and those among the people themselves." This is in considerable contrast to the banner headlines of the People's Daily for 1 May 1957, which had proclaimed that rectification would resolve contradiction "among the people" only. The question of contradictions "between our enemies and ourselves" had been treated as essentially solved and given scant attention at that time. As noted previously, the movement had evidently been conceived and initiated as a means of improving the "work style" of Communist party members in order to better relations between the party and nonparty masses and to make the party a more efficient tool for carrying out the ambitious economic plans of the regime.

Teng, however, mentioned among the motives of rectification the "extreme necessity of conducting a large-scale rectification movement among the fundamental column of the Communist party." The first necessity, he said, was to wage "a resolute struggle against the capitalist rightists and other antisocialist elements." The reason for this, he said, was that these elements were "extremely wanton and vicious in their attack against the socialist path and the leadership of the Communist party. They have a platform, organization, and plan. They aim at the restoration of capitalism and reactionary domination." He failed to point out that this alarming situation had apparently been discovered only after the rectification campaign was under way, and that it had not been taken into account in the original plan for the campaign.

Teng echoed earlier statements in his assertion that "the party is fundamentally healthy and the overwhelming majority of party-member cadres are good." He justified continuation of rectification within the party, however, by stating that "during the great blooming and contending of the masses, a considerable number of shortcomings in our work and in working styles were exposed--some of them quite serious." Meanwhile, he said there was still a small number of rightists among the party members and youth league members, and there were some others who harbored serious rightist-inclined ideas.

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Teng outlined the "correct methods" for handling contradictions among the people in the familiar vocabulary of rectification: "To practice great blooming, contending, and debating; to state the facts and to explain the reasons; to produce posters; and to hold symposia and debate meetings." During the great blooming and contending, he said, "we light the fire to consume our enemies and our own shortcomings as well. Both these things we want." Teng described fear of criticism and failure to "trust the masses" as rightist-inclined views, thus emphasizing the seriousness with which the party would regard cadres' failure to expose themselves to and accept criticism.

The changes in the aims and methods of the campaign between May and September were also apparent in Teng's division of rectification into stages. Earlier commentaries on rectification had spoken of three stages (see p.11), in which the emphasis lay entirely on the correction of faults within the party. Teng named four stages through which rectification would be required to pass in party and government agencies from national to county levels. These were: (1) Blooming and contending--with simultaneous rectification and improvement; (2) Repulsion of rightists--with simultaneous rectification and improvement; (3) Vigorous rectification and improvement; and (4) Study of relevant documents, criticism and introspection, and individual elevation. It will be seen that Teng's fourth stage comprised all of the rectification campaign as originally conceived; the three preceding stages became necessary because of the unforeseen reaction aroused during the opening weeks of the movement.

Teng implied that some agencies had successfully completed the first two stages by the time of his speech. "In all agencies where the antirightist struggle has gained a decisive victory," he said, efforts should be exerted to make the timely transition to the third stage of emphasizing rectification and improvement, as well as to conduct systematic criticism of bourgeois ideas." He took the precaution of adding, however, that "if more rightists are discovered during the third and fourth stages, or if known rightists remain with their heads held high, opposition to these rightists would naturally remain a task. Accordingly, these four stages must not be regarded too rigidly."

Teng also declared that rectification need not run its full course down to the lowest levels. He acknowledged that

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"some situations are different from those in official agencies, and the stages in the development of their movements are thus not entirely the same." While it is necessary to conduct socialist education among farmers and workers, he said, "only a small part of them should conduct criticism and self-criticism, just as it would be impossible to require everyone to follow the example of the official agencies in studying documents, criticism, and introspection." Teng also included students among those who "should continue blooming and contending and should urge and assist the leading cadres during the stage of rectification and improvement; they themselves, however, are not required to emphasize rectification and improvement as much as the leading cadres are." His hearers were thus reminded that cadres would not be permitted to overlook their own faults in their zeal to correct the faults of others.

Teng next discussed rectification as it applied to the bourgeoisie and intellectuals. In accordance with Communist dogma that intellectuals do not constitute a class in themselves, Teng was compelled to justify treating the two groups together. This he did by asserting: "In the present situation of our country, most intellectuals do come from bourgeois and petit-bourgeois family backgrounds, and the education which they received was in the bourgeois style. For the sake of convenience they are therefore grouped together with the bourgeoisie." Teng announced unequivocally their ultimate fate: "Elimination of the bourgeoisie is a fundamental question of the socialist revolution."

Teng's remarks reflected the disillusionment of the party leadership with respect to the degree to which the bourgeoisie and intellectuals had been persuaded to accept Communist leadership. "The bourgeoisie, especially their intellectuals," he said, "now constitute the main force that can challenge the proletariat. Politically they still have status, capital, and influence, and the proletariat needs their knowledge." The only way for bourgeois intellectuals to avoid a fatal clash with the proletariat, Teng added, was to transform themselves so as to serve the interests of the socialist economic foundation.

Teng maintained the pretense that the bourgeois "democratic" parties might still play a meaningful role. He reiterated the claim that "the party carries out the guiding principle of long-term coexistence and mutual supervision with regard to the democratic parties. Within the academic and cultural fields, the party

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calls on all schools of thought to contend and all flowers to bloom." He added the restriction, however, that "socialism is the premise for all these guiding principles and policies." Teng repeated the official explanation of the abortive "liberalization" policies of the early phases of rectification in his assertion that "encouraging 'poisonous weeds' to grow is done only to educate the masses through negative examples and to use them as fertilizer in the training of the proletariat and the masses."

Teng gave a great deal of attention to the shortcomings of the intellectuals. Only a small number of them had become leftists, he said, while many were still "thoroughly immersed in the bourgeois world outlook." To reform the intellectuals ideologically, Teng stated, was a long-term task which might take ten years or more. Meanwhile, he advocated the creation of a new group of intellectuals of working-class origin:

With a view to the successful building of socialism, the working class must have their own technical cadres; they must also have their own professors, teachers, scientists, journalists, men of letters, artists, and Marxist theoreticians. A group on such a scale cannot be formed with a small number of people. The whole party must endeavor to cultivate revolutionary experts.

This virtual abandonment of the attempt to convert existing intellectuals in favor of a drive to cultivate a group of thoroughly proletarian intellectuals--a drive characteristic of the latter months of the rectification campaign--again illustrates the profound changes which had taken place in the campaign since its inception and which the party leaders were attempting to gloss over.

Teng's speech dealt at length with the problems of political and ideological work in rural areas. The emphasis was largely on the need to strengthen and consolidate agricultural cooperatives, especially by increasing capital funds and development of cooperative-owned capital construction projects. Teng foreshadowed the "leap forward" of 1958 by declaring that, following the "great debate" between socialism and capitalism, another such debate on agricultural production and construction "will give impetus to an upsurge" during the winter.

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Teng, of course, strongly urged rural cadres to follow closely the party's "mass line" in the course of their operations. In advocating the mass line, Teng made an unusually frank statement regarding one of the principal motives behind this method of encouraging mass participation in party programs:

If we allow the broad masses to discuss and make decisions on the undertakings launched by us, all will bear the responsibility of failure and a lesson will thus be learned. Such a practice is of great importance to the consolidation of unity and the correction of errors. Cadres on the basic level should be trained to pay close attention to this at all times.

Teng's remarks on rectification among the working class were relatively limited, presumably because this aspect of the campaign had not produced the difficulties that had arisen with respect to the bourgeoisie and the intellectuals, nor was it as important to the economy as the stabilization of agriculture. Teng urged that cadres participate regularly in physical labor and that they "plunge deeply into actual production, establish close relations with the workers, and show concern for the pain and hardship of the masses, so that they may make the workers feel at home while living with them. All privileges in livelihood enjoyed only by the cadres should be resolutely abolished."

Teng touched lightly on the question of rectification among the minority nationalities. He particularly attacked local nationalism and "great Han chauvinism," the two bugbears of minority policy. Teng demonstrated a willingness to recognize realities regarding these matters by declaring that "it should be pointed out to cadres and members of the upper strata of the minority nationalities" that these two tendencies were a "danger to the unity and unification of the various nationalities of the socialist motherland."

Teng also dealt briefly with rectification among the armed forces. A few rightists had been discovered in the armed forces, he said, "but the composition of the armed forces in general is comparatively pure." Teng commented that after the conclusion of the antirightist struggle, rectification in the armed forces should concentrate on the working style of the officers. He noted, for example, that "relations between the forces and local party and government organs have not been close."

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In discussing the specific application of rectification to problems within the Communist party, Teng returned to a considerable degree to the original aims of the campaign. He attributed the party's difficulties to three factors: first, most of the party members came from nonproletarian families; second, party organs were developed at such a speed that the quality of members was neglected and ideological and political work failed to keep abreast of development; and third and most important, the great majority of party members, admitted to the party in an environment and at a time when victory had already been achieved, lacked genuine socialist awareness at the time of admission.

During the third and fourth stages of rectification, Teng said, problems within the party should receive more attention than those outside. He urged that the party "henceforth endeavor to choose for promotion to cadres persons of fine character who are of worker and peasant origin." This was to correct a situation arising from the fact that "during a certain period in the past we absorbed too many young intellectuals who had not undergone productive labor, steeling, and actual struggle for work." Teng also declared that "an appropriate plan should be mapped out to enable graduates of universities, colleges, and technical schools to do manual work in production organizations suited to their specialties" for at least one year after graduation.

Teng devoted disproportionate attention to a question which was not a major part of rectification and must therefore have been one which was proving troublesome to the party at the time of his speech. This was the so-called "localization of cadres" which Teng defined in his complaint by stating that "some people even hold the sentiment of wishing to cast out cadres from other localities." Teng declared that party cadre policy had never been governed by the principle of localization of cadres. He justified assignment of "outside" cadres to certain areas by stating that "localism and Communism are incompatible," and that selection and promotion of local cadres must necessarily continue to observe the principle of the dual requirement of political and professional qualification.

A re-emphasis on the original aims of rectification--after three months of concentration on the antirightist struggle--was especially apparent in the final section of Teng's speech devoted to the party's faults and the methods to be used in overcoming them. Pointing out the party's more glaring defects, Teng noted that "many regulations and systems are unreasonable, impractical, and redundant," and

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that there were "indications of excessive centralism as well as divisionism." He also noted that many organizations and persons had shown indications of "seriously alienating themselves from reality and the masses." These people, Teng said, had been busy with their functional duties and had had few contacts with the masses; therefore they had little understanding of the problems confronting the masses. The third major defect among party members was that "numerous cadres are arrogant and self-satisfied, think of themselves as always right, ignore the mass line, and fail to consult the masses on all matters."

Teng presented a three-point program for correction of these faults within the party during the remainder of the rectification campaign. Under the heading "Overcoming Sectarianism and the Deviation toward Special Privilege," he observed that members of the Communist party "must be just and selfless, join the masses, and share the bitter and sweet in life." Party members, Teng said, should have more friends and closer associations with the nonparty masses and personages. He declared that there should not be a great difference between the living standards of cadres and masses.

The second part of the program presented by Teng was concerned with correcting irrational practices, making "appropriate adjustments" in the relations between the party and the government and between higher and lower levels, and correcting excessive centralism. Teng cited as a basis for effecting these improvements, three documents which had been drawn up by the politburo and submitted to the plenary session of the central committee prior to his speech. These documents contained the decentralization plan, under which a considerable amount of authority in certain types of enterprises would be shifted from higher to lower levels. "Such change," Teng said, "definitely means an improvement in the present systems."

Under the second part of his program, Teng discussed at some length the necessity for a "vigorous retrenchment" in the "excessive number of functionaries in party and government organs and nonproductive personnel in enterprises and public institutions." These "inflated and overstaffed organizations," he said, "had also contributed to the growth of subjectivism and bureaucratism." This enforced migration of cadres from urban centers to the countryside became a conspicuous feature of the rectification campaign during the following months. Teng pointed out and subsequent rectification propaganda endlessly reiterated that these measures would

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have two beneficial results: the efficiency of the organizations involved would be raised through savings in manpower and money, and an army of "steeled cadres who are devoted to the cause of Communism and can weather storms" would be created.

Teng's third proposal was for the purpose of "broadening democracy among the people and continuing to strengthen the democratic system." This meant, in effect, methods for putting the regime's programs into effect with the least possible resistance among the people. Teng stressed the use of persuasion and education as a means to this end. He repeated the slogans with which the campaign had opened: that rectification would be conducted like a "gentle rain or mild breeze" and under the banner of "unity--criticism--unity."

Teng closed his speech with a plea for greater attention to work improvement. Pointing out that performance in this regard had been better in some areas than in others, he warned against using the antirightist struggle to cover up mistakes and to "evade rectification and improvement and sneak over the hurdle." In the course of improving work, Teng said, "our slogan for the masses should be: Express your opinions resolutely, boldly, and thoroughly. Our slogan for leading personnel should be: Improve work resolutely, boldly, and thoroughly."

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High-level Promotion of the Campaign, November 1957

The People's Daily editorials of early September 1957 and Teng Hsiao-ping's report to the third plenary session of the eighth central committee of the Chinese Communist party set the course which the rectification campaign was to follow during the remainder of the year and, in many important respects, throughout the remainder of the campaign. The only further fundamental development which the campaign was to undergo began early in 1958, when rectification was merged with the "great leap forward" in economic progress. During the intervening months, however, the rectification movement continued to dominate domestic propaganda and its doctrinal basis was elaborated by comments in the People's Daily and statements by major leaders.

The People's Daily editorial of 1 November 1957 was entitled "The All-People Rectification Campaign Is an Important Development of the Socialist Democracy of Our Country." The editorial followed Teng's example by setting "contradictions between the enemy and ourselves" ahead of "contradictions within the ranks of the people" as targets for the campaign. The methods used to resolve these contradictions, the newspaper said, had given rise to "a new type of socialist democracy compatible with the current political and ideological socialist revolution."

The editorial harked back to the rectification campaign of 1942 in order to demonstrate the innovations of the current movement. The former movement, it said, had been carried out by means of systematic criticism and self-criticism and had enabled all Communist party members to correct their mistakes and raise their ideological standards. The earlier campaign was also characterized by the use of wall posters and the convocation of symposia, according to the editorial. The paper stated that subsequent reform programs had used the method of "reasoning struggle" and that mass criticism and self-criticism had been "universally adopted" in factories, rural areas, schools, and the armed forces.

These "traditional democratic methods," the editorial said, had recently developed into "a complete new form of socialist democracy characterized by 'contending, blooming, and debating.'" By these methods, it was claimed, "all problems are solved quickly, totally, and finally."

The editorial disparaged those who feared this process and claimed that the regime's program had the support of the

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great majority of the people. In support of this contention, the editorial asserted that the main force of the revolution in China had been "the most oppressed and suppressed strata in the old society--the workers, poor peasants, and lower-middle peasants." These and others who support socialism were said to account for approximately 90 percent of the country's population. As for the remaining 10 percent, the editorial stated, not all "were resolutely opposed to socialism, either." In fact, it was claimed, only 1 or 2 percent of the people opposed socialism, and those had been isolated among the masses.

The editorial described the inception of the antirightist campaign in somewhat sanguine terms: "At the height of the 'contending' and 'blooming' by the rightists, there seemed to be a little turbulence in the revolutionary regime." The silver lining in this cloud was revealed, however, when "as soon as the masses clearly identified this enemy and launched an attack on him, the revolutionary regime not only stopped the turbulence but also became 100 times more consolidated." Should "blooming and contending" not be permitted, the editorial said, minor disturbances, and perhaps even major ones, would break out.

The editorial admitted that the campaign had departed at times from its intended gentle nature. This was justified, however, because "since the outset of the rectification campaign, the rightists have attacked us with stormy force." Although the masses had been obliged to retaliate in kind, the newspaper said, "this campaign will eventually return to its 'breeze and gentle rain' character in the end."

Another significant comment on rectification appeared on 1 November in the form of a statement by Ko Ching-shih, first secretary of the Shanghai Communist party committee. Several of Ko's pronouncements on rectification received national attention, and he was elevated to the party's politburo at the May 1958 session of the party congress.

Ko observed that 1,000,000 people in Shanghai had joined in the rectification campaign and that "over 1,000 units" in the city had entered the third stage of rectification and improvement. Ko pointed out, however, several significant faults in the movement. Most noteworthy was his statement that "a majority of leading cadres hesitate to admit their mistakes and shortcomings and thus hesitate to reform." A large number of leading cadres, Ko said, had "committed formalism and bureaucracy in accepting proposals and criticisms

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of the masses and in carrying out the work of rectification and improvement." Many units, he added, had taken action to overcome mistakes and shortcomings, "but their actions were only superficial and not basic."

Ko demanded that leading cadres be the first to improve their work and rectify their working styles, since "'rectification and improvement' means to improve work and to rectify the working style of the whole party." He implied a tendency toward complacency by declaring that "it is wrong to think that the rectification campaign is over as soon as the 'blooming' and 'contending' and the antirightist struggle have been concluded."

Ko called attention, as had the People's Daily editorial of the same day, to the "illogic, impracticality, and contradictions in many regulations and systems." He asserted that many leading cadres allowed important matters to be disposed of by lower-level personnel, called too many meetings to discuss matters both essential and nonessential, did not follow the "mass line," or failed to practice diligence and thrift. Leading cadres should not only overcome such defects, Ko said, but should also strive to raise their ideological level.

Ko referred also to the "problem of cadres participating in manual and production work." He pointed out--somewhat inaccurately--that this was the basic system of the nation, and he called upon leading cadres to practice frugality, improve their relations with the masses, and train themselves in factories, in schools, or in the countryside.

Mao Tse-tung himself provided an interpretation of the rectification campaign on 6 November 1957 in the course of a speech in Moscow on the occasion of the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution. While granting due deference to the example of his Soviet hosts, Mao asserted: "The Chinese revolution has its own national characteristics, and it is entirely necessary to take these into consideration." He spoke with pride of his regime's accomplishments, claiming that "in the short period of eight years, China has already achieved in various fields of construction results in it was not able to achieve in the past 100 years." Mao dismissed rather casually the severe criticisms directed against the Communist party during the previous summer:

In China a handful of bourgeois rightists try to oppose taking the path to socialism and oppose the leading position of the Communist party in national life, as

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well as the close union between China and the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. Their vain efforts have been utterly defeated by the counterattack of the people throughout our country.

In describing the rectification campaign, Mao returned to the emphasis with which the campaign had begun and mentioned only that it was "a campaign to resolve correctly the contradictions which actually exist among the people and which have to be resolved immediately by means of a nationwide debate which is both guided and free, carried out in the urban and rural areas." Mao did not refer to the need to resolve contradictions between "ourselves and the enemy" which had been given primacy by the People's Daily and Teng Hsiao-ping during September--an omission which may have been due to a desire to place China's internal situation in the best possible light for his non-Chinese audience.

Mao claimed great successes for the rectification campaign and added: "We are now carrying forward this people's self-education campaign among our 600,000,000 people, stage by stage and section by section, and it is probable that in another few months nationwide success will have been achieved." He failed to explain the circumstance that six months previously the campaign had been intended to last only six months.

Mao discreetly claimed credit for invention of the rectification method: "In many years of revolutionary practice we have developed the method of the rectification campaign in accordance with the Leninist principles of keeping in close contact with the masses, recognizing the initiative of the masses, and practicing criticism and self-criticism." He announced that in the future there would be periodic rectification campaigns "every year or every other year" as one of the main methods of resolving various social contradictions in the country "during the whole period of transition." He said, however, that these subsequent campaigns would be much shorter than the current one.

On the same day on which Mao spoke in Moscow, Liu Shao-chi delivered an address in Peiping celebrating the same occasion. Liu paid perfunctory respects to the occasion and then turned to a discussion of the current situation in China and the progress of rectification. He declared that although the "socialist revolution in our country in the ownership of the means of production was in the main completed in 1956," a mere change in the economic system was insufficient and that

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"the class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the working class is not yet at an end." Only socialism could save China, he said, and it was a "sheer hoax" that socialism could be built without party leadership or without the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Liu identified the unforgivable sin of the "bourgeois rightists" when he said they "actually oppose Marxism-Leninism itself." They were certain to be defeated, he said, because of the general trend toward the road to socialism which must be taken--"the only difference being that the majority are going ahead on their own accord, while a minority do so under compulsion." Liu presented this process as an inexorable one in which "there may be a difference in precedence, but no freedom of standing still."

Liu discussed rectification itself in terms of the accepted clichés, defining it as "a full and frank expression of opinions, general debates, wall posters, discussions, forums, and so on." He defended the "democracy" embodied in the rectification process and attacked those rightists who complained that there was only centralism but no democracy in the country. Liu resorted to the same imagery which Teng Hsiao-ping had used in September in his declaration that "the flames of full and frank criticism will burn out not only the enemy, but our own shortcomings and mistakes as well."

Liu gave considerable attention to the need for rapid economic progress. He urged "quantity, speed, quality, and economy" in building socialism--a slogan which became the watchword of the latter stages of the rectification campaign. Liu spoke of the necessity for austerity and increased accumulation on the part of individuals and organizations as a condition for achieving these goals.

Liu also touched on the "red and expert" theme, stating that the working class must have its own force of scientific and technical personnel, its own professors, teachers, scientists, journalists, writers, artists, jurists, and Marxist-Leninist theorists. He acknowledged that this force would also include "all those intellectuals who, though coming from the old society, have been really remolded and firmly take the working-class stand." This force of working-class intellectuals, Liu said, must be a vast one; a small number would not do.

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Vigorous Implementation of the Campaign, November-December 1957

On 21 November 1957, Hsi Chung-hsun, secretary general of the State Council, delivered his "second rectification campaign mobilization report." Hsi spoke to a meeting of cadres of the various offices and organs under the direct control of the State Council. The party organization of these governmental offices became the spearhead of the campaign, and periodic reports on the progress of rectification at this level were used as guides for forthcoming developments at lower echelons.

Hsi began by stating bluntly that it could not be assumed that all personnel of state organization were serving the cause of Communism devotedly and responsibly. "The state demands the proper transformation of each and every one of us," he said. This was to include the eradication of even the smallest shortcomings, Hsi stated, since "a number of veteran cadres of from 10 to 20 years' standing sometimes commit mistakes because of these 'small shortcomings.'" Hsi admitted that there were also "some cadres who have not been transformed at all."

Hsi Chung-hsun described the rectification campaign as only a transient matter, while the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat--"particularly their struggle on the political and ideological fronts"--was a long-term task. The "up-surge in the present revolution," however, was an opportunity for the party to conduct "a systematic and thoroughgoing socialist education program among the great masses of cadres and the people."

Hsi's report, like Teng Hsiao-ping's in September, foreshadowed the coming link between rectification and the "great leap forward." Hsi declared that "without a number of revolutionary, sudden progressions, it would be impossible to build socialism." He stated that in his opinion, "the all-people rectification campaign this year is a sudden revolutionary progression. The forthcoming upsurge in socialist construction in rural areas will constitute another sudden revolutionary progression."

Hsi criticized the progress of "contending and blooming" and complained that some units imposed restrictions regarding matters to be discussed. Even the private lives of cadres should be discussed, he said, "if the private life involves the violation of law and discipline." Hsi said that within the secretariat of the State Council the major fault in criticism and discussion was that few big issues which needed radical correction had been touched on. Such issues were the most difficult to talk about, he added, and thus this situation was natural. In the future,

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however, "blooming and contending" should be carried out more deeply and in a more thoroughgoing manner."

As for methods of conducting "blooming and contending," Hsi recommended wall posters as "not merely one way, but the principal way." He said the various state organizations had posted more than 220,000 such posters and advanced more than 380,000 "rationalization proposals." The number of wall posters and the number of problems they submit, Hsi claimed, would determine the extent of an upsurge in contending and blooming. "The masses," he stated, "hold that 'symposia serve the purpose of giving a warning in comparative privacy and wall posters serve the purpose of doing so in public'; this shows that wall posters are loved by the masses." For this reason, he continued, "wall posters should be used as the principal means of conducting contending and blooming. Symposia and debate conferences can only be considered as auxiliary means for doing so."

Hsi found fault with the progress of rectification and improvement as well as with contending and blooming. The leaders of some organizations, he said, "should realize that contending and blooming has been conducted solely for the purpose of rectification and improvement. For this reason, after contending and blooming, rectification and improvement must follow. If they fail to dovetail with each other, the campaign will cease to progress."

Hsi cited three reasons why the campaign seemed to have lost much of its vigor: "1) lack of experience; 2) the ineptitude of the leadership in treading the mass line and its lack of courage and resourcefulness in carrying out this work; and 3) the practice of treating this work in the same way as common matters are treated." This last practice, he said, was tantamount to attempting to overcome bureaucratism by bureaucratic means.

Hsi reminded his listeners that rectification was a revolutionary movement and that "we should not be too gentle in this work." On the contrary, he said, "we should break out of the old rules with which we used to confine ourselves in the past." If the leadership adopted a "great, fighting spirit in conducting this campaign," the faults noted above could be corrected. Hsi cautioned, however, that the work of the campaign should be carried out systematically as well as seriously.

Hsi discussed at some length the policy of sending cadres to lower levels for physical labor. A number of units had taken advantage of this work simply to get rid of some cadres, he said, but "this is not correct." The policy was not intended to "get rid of the bulge" or to "haul in the sails," Hsi maintained, but

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to "make over-all arrangements for over-all transformation." It would result, he said, in the establishment of "an army of cadres who have struggled for the cause of Communism, who have been trained, and who are able to survive trying circumstances." He added that it would be only a matter of time before "each cadre, particularly each young intellectual, undergoes this course."

Hsi was frank in his presentation of the difficulties of the program. He said that "some have painted a beautiful picture of living conditions in rural areas," but that "this is not realistic." If the picture is too beautiful, he claimed, the cadres are bound to be disappointed when they get there." Hsi admitted that transfer to rural areas involved a "cataclysmic change" for the person concerned. Therefore, he said, "it is better to tell them realistically and to prepare them mentally; otherwise, after you push them into that environment they will one day come back and grumble at you." In another note of realism, Hsi recommended that the transfer of cadres be done selectively "so as not to add to the troubles of the peasants."

In another statement on 5 December 1957, before a conference of the Communist party committee for the central government agencies, Hsi Chung-hsun again spoke bluntly on the progress of the rectification campaign. He said that inadequate rectification and improvement remained the major shortcomings, and that as a means of correcting this situation, leading organizations should "master the trends in the wall posters" by assigning them serial numbers and organizing them into sequence for analysis.

Hsi again concluded his statement with a reference to the downward transfer of cadres. Notice was served unequivocally on those in authority that no delay would be tolerated: "This is a rather urgent problem--one in which the leadership either takes the initiative or else loses it, with the consequence of hindering progress in the rectification campaign." Hsi claimed that many persons had "applied" for transfer to lower levels and that the various localities had made preparations for them. "Any lack of enthusiasm in this matter," he threatened, "would result in undesirable consequences."

The Chinese Communist press reported about this time that more than 810,000 personnel had been transferred to lower levels throughout the country. In the future, it was predicted, the number of persons to be transferred to the "labor front and to

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lower levels for practical training" would far exceed this figure. Some of those already transferred were said to be intellectuals who had not had any experience in productive labor. Others were cadres from "administrative organs, business units, and enterprises, and personnel holding such positions as messengers, servants, and probational employees," who were "comparatively more familiar with rural and low-level work."

In the 15 major provinces and three major municipalities of China a total of 575,000 persons were reported to have been "sent down." Some 303,000 of these had been assigned to the "labor front," while the remainder had obtained work in basic-level organizations. The report spoke enthusiastically of the results of this movement, claiming that "many intellectuals who used to find it hard to identify the five grains and who used to 'take wheat sprouts for leeks' had now gained much agricultural knowledge." Many of the cadres who used to "cover their noses with handkerchiefs when they came across a dunghill now scramble to carry baskets loaded with dung," according to the report.

On the other side of the picture, it was reported that state-owned enterprises in Peiping had reduced the ration between administrative cadres and workers from 38.4 to 11.2 percent. In Tientsin, it was claimed, 80 to 90 percent of the cadres in some government organizations had applied for "productive labor in factories or farm work in the countryside." Comparable statistics were cited for many other areas throughout the country.

Another major statement on the progress of rectification was made on 9 December by Chiang Hua, first secretary of the Communist party committee of Chekiang Province. The significance of this report is indicated by the fact that it was subsequently published by the People's Daily, which allotted it two full pages and commented editorially that "the questions dealt with in the first part of the report are nationwide, not just local in character."

Chiang reviewed the course of the rectification campaign with the customary bland assertion that the antirightist aspect had been intended from the beginning. As for the current status of the campaign in his own province, Chiang said, most of the leading organs above the county level had obtained "preliminary experience," and that cadres had "begun to master the new working style of socialist democracy." Practice had shown that the instructions of the Communist party central committee

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and of Chairman Mao had been absolutely correct, Chiang said, but "it must be pointed out that the socialist revolution we have carried out on the political and ideological front during the past year is still in the process of gradual development on the basis of studying, practicing, and accumulating experience."

The heart of Chiang's report lay in his discussion of certain "diverse views" which had existed in the party. With unusual candor he admitted that "in the course of this great change, the understanding of certain questions has not been entirely unanimous in the party." Citing the authority of "the directive of the party central committee and Chairman Mao"--presumably the directive which inaugurated the rectification campaign on 1 May 1957--Chiang offered four "explanations" in connection with these divergent views.

First, Chiang said, "there appeared an extreme rightist tendency and a 'leftist' tendency" during the first half of 1957. Those guilty of the extreme rightist tendency failed to discern that contradictions "between the enemy and ourselves" still existed, while the second tendency exaggerated such contradictions. Both of these views were held within the party, Chiang stated, and should be corrected by a careful assessment of the motives of those who offered criticism, so that those who were merely confused or mistaken would not be wrongly regarded as "enemies."

Chiang next pointed out that "many comrades" failed to realize that "the situation develops with intermittent tensed and relaxed periods along a winding and complicated path of progress." For this reason, he said, "with the decisive victory achieved in the antirightist struggle and with the class enemies forced into retreat, relaxation may appear in the struggle at certain periods." Chiang warned, however, that under certain conditions the rightists might again launch new attacks against socialism and that "fluctuations of this kind in the struggle will occur repeatedly for a number of years."

Chiang's third point referred to the significance of civil disturbances--a rare admission that such disturbances had occurred. Chiang mentioned specifically certain incidents which had resulted in "the disintegration of many agricultural co-operatives" in one country of his province. This had been bad, he said, but it had had a good effect in the end.

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After the provincial and district committees dispatch functionaries to strengthen leadership and sum up experiences and lessons, it became possible to rectify effectively the rightist ideas and the bureaucratic and commandist working methods on the part of certain functionaries, to strike down the destructive activities mounted by the enemies, and to develop the socialist education campaign in the rural areas."

Chiang's fourth "explanation" dealt with the "new form of the mass line--large-scale blooming, contending, debating, and posters." Many comrades had not yet fully realized the advantages of these methods, he said, while some "appeared to lack determination and confidence" in them "for fear that they would incur difficulties, would lose out in debates with others, or would 'draw fire on themselves.'" Chiang advised the universal panacea of "confidence in the masses" as a remedy.

Chiang concluded his report with a reminder that "improvement in work is equally as important as the antirightist struggle." He said that work improvement was only beginning, and that leading organs should conscientiously strengthen leadership over this aspect of the campaign.

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"Rectification" Firmly Linked to Economic Upsurge

With the opening of the new year the rectification campaign entered its last major phase. This was heralded in the People's Daily editorial for 1 January 1958 entitled "Ride the Wind and Break the Waves!" The editorial began with the observation that "the thoughts of man usually fall behind reality with respect to an adequate estimation of developments affecting the objective situation." In a mood of exuberant optimism the paper maintained that the events of 1957, both international and domestic, bore out this conclusion. With regard to the international situation, the editorial quoted the slogan used by Mao in Moscow that "the east wind prevails over the west wind"; domestically, the rectification campaign was cited as one of the "brilliant victories" achieved by the people during 1957.

The editorial pointed out that the rectification campaign was not over, however, since "what remains to be done is to resolve contradictions between the remaining bourgeoisie and the proletariat and between the capitalist path and the socialist path during the period of transition." This struggle between the capitalist and socialist paths was a contradiction "between the enemies and ourselves" in comparatively few instances, the editorial said, "while in the greater number of cases it proves to be a contradiction within the ranks of the people."

The editorial declared that the current task of the rectification campaign was to strive for complete victory on all fronts before May 1958. The campaign, it said, had been a "motive force pushing forward the work in all fields, and should be regarded as the 'key to all activities.'" The paper urged all-out efforts to carry the rectification campaign to people throughout the whole country. The editorial expressed the conviction of its writers that "victorious completion of this campaign will give our society a new appearance and stimulate the energetic initiative of the people as never before. It will unleash an immense tide of growth in industry, agriculture, and all other constructive work."

The rectification campaign was thus officially harnessed to the drive for economic progress. "Using the great achievements of the rectification campaign, the successful completion

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of the First Five-Year Plan, and other favorable conditions," the paper said, "we must mobilize all positive factors and apply ourselves to all the construction projects, with industry and frugality as the guiding principle, and, on the basis of quantity, speed, quality, and economy, create a victorious beginning for the Second Five-Year Plan."

On 19 January 1958, Hsi Chung-hsun, secretary general of the State Council, spoke again on the subject of rectification. His words, blunt and to the point as usual, indicated clearly the new direction which the campaign had taken. Hsi criticized the campaign's progress in familiar terms and emphasized the continuing danger of rightist errors both within and outside the party. These errors, he said, were evidenced by undue conservatism and failure to keep up with the masses (i.e., the demands of the party) in the headlong plunge toward socialism.

Hsi then specified the first step by which rectification would be called upon to aid the economic drive. "At the advanced stage of the rectification campaign," he said, "an antiwaste movement should be carried out." Hsi declared that "all our central state organs, whether they be industrial, cultural, or educational, are guilty of some waste in spending their construction and administrative funds." This state of affairs, he said, must be "clarified from an ideological point of view and solved once and for all." Otherwise, he stated, it would be "impossible for us to carry out the policy of the Communist party central committee to build our country industriously and economically and to do so on a larger, quicker, better, and more economical scale."

It was apparent from Hsi's final remarks that pursuit of the rectification campaign had been causing interference with the performance of day-to-day functions. Hsi advocated equal attention to the tasks of handling rightists, carrying out the rectification campaign, and continuing regular operational work. He said it should be possible for these tasks to be carried out without their interfering with each other. Hsi pointed out, however: "It should be realized that it is possible to make up for regular operational work later on, if such is sacrificed for the sake of the rectification campaign. But if the rectification campaign is sacrificed because of operational work, it may become impossible to solve some ideological questions--a matter of much greater importance."

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Perhaps as a counterbalance to Hsi's remarks, People's Daily a few days later published another report by Ko Ching-shih, first secretary of the Shanghai Communist party committee, calling attention to some of the original goals of rectification. The paper endorsed Ko's views highly, saying that his report was "worthy of conscientious study because it is filled with revolutionary spirit." Ko particularly attacked the bureaucracy of some cadres, pointing out that "the views voiced by the masses highlight their dissatisfaction with the 'bureaucracy' practiced by these party cadres." People's Daily commented that this passage of the report was very good and went on to offer some further comments on the subject.

The paper observed that the "bureaucracy" which Ko Ching-shih had attacked was, in fact, "our most dangerous enemy." It defined this bureaucracy as "a working style which is divorced from the masses." The paper pointed out, however, that since "as little as 10 percent of our working personnel are guilty of this working style," people should not make the rightist mistake of regarding all Communist party members and government personnel in that light.

The editorial warned that the struggle against bureaucracy would be a long one since "in a socialist society, or even in a Communist society of the future, contradictions between the leaders and the led may exist for prolonged periods." Such contradictions were said to belong to those within the ranks of the people, however, and should be treated according to "democratic methods through logical reasoning, not by forceful suppression as exercised against the enemy."

On 2 February 1958, People's Daily formally launched the antiwaste campaign which had been anticipated by Hsi Chung-hsun a fortnight earlier. Citing a report delivered before the National People's Congress by Li Hsien-nien on the previous day, the editorial proposed the slogan "Oppose waste and build the country on the basis of industry and thrift" as a guide for action for people throughout the country.

The days preceding the fifth session of the National People's Congress in February were utilized by the "democratic" parties for meetings at which each party formally expelled from its ranks those who had been accused as rightists during the months since mid-1957. On the day before the congress

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officially convened, the standing committee announced the removal from office of the three non-Communist ministers who had been the principal subjects of attack during the early phase of the "antirightist struggle."

As its first item of business, the congress considered a credentials report which stated that 16 rightists "who had betrayed the fundamental principles of the Constitution" had been recalled by their electoral districts. Another 38 rightists whose constituencies reported that they should be recalled were cited in the credentials report. Ten of the latter had held posts on the standing committee of the National People's Congress and on the National Defense Council.

On its opening day the congress also heard a report by Li Hsien-nien, vice premier and minister of finance, on the implementation of the 1957 state budget and the proposed budget for 1958. Li praised the achievements of 1957 which, he said, had overfulfilled the economic plans for the year and thus assured fulfillment of the First Five-Year Plan. These achievements, Li said, were also "eloquent proof of the immense vitality of the socialist system and a rebuff to the slander of the bourgeois rightists regarding our country's financial and economic condition."

Li admitted there had been some temporary and local difficulties in carrying out financial and economic plans and said the rightists had "rejoiced at our temporary troubles." They had been proved wrong, he asserted, and now "we even want to thank them, because like poisonous weeds turning into fertilizer, their attacks have greatly helped to raise the consciousness of the working people to new heights and thus have greatly pushed forward the movement to increase production and practice economy."

The final section of Li's report was an appeal to "oppose conservatism and waste, and ensure the implementation of the 1958 state budget with a large-scale movement to increase production and practice economy." The situation was favorable for such developments, he said, since "on every front of our national economy there has now arisen a gigantic upsurge for socialist construction, aiming at greater quantity, faster speed, better quality, and greater economy." Li said that rectification had contributed to this situation because

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"in the process of rectification, the broad masses of workers and staff members made many proposals to overcome waste and to do more things with less money."

Li claimed that "the rectification movement is developing and penetrating into the basic units, the factories, mines and enterprises, and the agricultural producers' cooperatives." The campaign, he said, would "continue to impel leading personnel at various levels to rectify their style in work, to go down among the masses and into the actual work of production." Li had high praise for this program and added: "This kind of change in the style in work of leading personnel at various levels will certainly help bring about a tremendous growth of industrial and agricultural production in 1958."

Li stressed the need to expand and develop the movement to increase production and practice economy in order to render possible the "gigantic leap in production" contemplated for 1958. In the course of the rectification campaign, he said, it would be necessary that "every enterprise, every economic department, and every unit should set aside ten days or so to launch frank and full expression of opinion and debates on the question of opposing waste and mobilize the broadest masses to wage an uncompromising struggle against all waste."

The other major report to the National People's Congress was that delivered by Chou En-lai entitled "The Present International Situation and China's Foreign Policy." Chou began his report with a tribute to the rectification campaign, although it was not precisely germane to the matters under consideration. In the latter half of 1957, he said, the Chinese people, "led by the Chinese Communist party and Chairman Mao Tse-tung," had "repulsed the frenzied attacks of the bourgeois rightists." Chou stated that the rectification campaign, "which continues with growing intensity, enables our people to take great forward leaps in construction, filling them with enthusiasm and fresh ardor and infusing an unprecedented new spirit into our work in various fields." Echoing the exuberant tone then prevalent in official statements, Chou added: "Our nation rides the rising tide; it is driving full steam ahead in the work of socialist construction."

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Economic Goals Emphasized, Other Reaffirmed

"The rectification campaign is giving rise to a new 'flood crest' in all enterprises, undertakings, and government organizations," announced a People's Daily editorial on 18 February 1958. That is, the newspaper continued, "a new high tide of contending and blooming and a new high tide of administrative improvement designed to combat waste and conservatism are being raised." The editorial reported that in the course of this high tide the personnel of governmental organizations in Peiping had put out 250,000 wall posters, and the workers and office employees of 31 enterprises in the city had put out 200,000 posters and offered 430,000 suggestions--all within a period of 20 days. This "grand movement" was said to be aimed at "thorough implementation of the principle of doing more, faster, better, and more economically in national construction and at the promotion of a big leap forward in production and work."

The editorial declared that combating waste and conservatism had become the central problem of the rectification campaign. "Judging by what is taking place in various districts and government organizations and enterprises," it continued, "the present movement against waste and conservatism differs from all previous increase-production and practice-economy movements in that it has actually become a struggle against all backward phenomena in the ideological, political, and economic fields and that it has brought about a high tide of emulation." It was claimed that the movement was "obviously an outgrowth of the socialist revolution on the political and ideological fronts which began last year throughout the country."

While reaffirming the emphasis on economic matters, however, the editorial reminded readers that the original goals of rectification could not be ignored. The editorial accused some units of lacking a thorough knowledge of the situation with the result that they neglected "ideological work, concerned themselves only with economic problems, and simply took some technical measures instead of seriously developing popular debate and completely changing the methods of work and style of leadership." The proper procedure, the editorial said, was to tackle both the economic problems and the ideological and political problems so that "through contending, blooming, and debate we should not only combat waste and conservatism but also combat bureaucracy, sectarianism and subjectivism."

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The campaign to "combat waste and conservatism"--promoted on a national scale by the People's Daily on 2 February 1958 apparently to last a few weeks--was extended on 3 March by a Communist party central committee directive lengthening it two or three months. During the last days of February and the month of March, the "leap forward" received added impetus as the production goals which had been set forth at the National People's Congress were surpassed verbally by new "fighting targets"--supposedly advanced by the workers themselves in individual factories and in whole industries throughout the country. By early April, Hu Yao-pang, first secretary of the Young Communists League, spoke of a new "workers' target" of an increase of 33 percent in industrial production for 1958--a considerable contrast with the goal of 14.5 percent presented to the National People's Congress in February.

Further reports on the number of cadres "sent down" to work in the countryside, factories, or in basic-level organizations at this period indicated the rapid pace at which this part of the program was being carried out. The New China News Agency reported on 23 February that 1,300,000 cadres had already departed for the countryside or lower levels, more than half a million more than in December. Reports indicated that a total of about 2,750,000 cadres were slated for such treatment in the various provinces and municipalities throughout the country. It was announced that the program was to be completed by April 1958.

At the end of February 1958, People's Daily published an article by Chou Yang, a deputy director of the Communist party's propaganda department. The article was said to have been written "on the basis of a speech made at an enlarged session of the Communist party group in the Union of Chinese Writers on 16 September 1957, with revisions and additions, and after exchanges of opinion with comrades in literary and art circles." Chou Yang has frequently been given the assignment of laying down the law in cultural circles for the apparent purpose of correcting any misapprehensions that might arise regarding the means of distinguishing "flowers" from "weeds."

Chou Yang justified his attention to the "great debate on the literary and art front" by asserting that "literature and art are the barometer of the times; whenever any drastic change is about to take place in the situation of the class struggle,

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signs of it may be seen on the barometer." He then proceeded to embed nuggets of advice to authors in a matrix of illogic and propaganda which repeated and exaggerated the official explanations of the "rightist attacks" of the previous summer.

Chou Yang declared that "one's attitude toward the Hungarian episode has become an important criterion by which one may be judged as to whether one is a true Communist and a true revolutionary." He returned to this theme repeatedly throughout his long and rambling article. Chou, after asking rhetorically whether one ought to be a revolutionary or a reactionary, answered his own question unequivocally: "Now that we are at the stage of socialist revolution, we must oppose capitalism and follow the socialist road if we are to remain revolutionaries. If you want to follow the capitalist road, then you are a reactionary. These are the only alternatives; there is no middle road." This provides a good example of the sort of "debate" which characterized the latter stages of rectification.

Chou Yang enunciated another rule that furnished the text for many pious sermons on the function of the arts in the new society: "In a socialist society individualism is the root of all evil." He solved the many contradictions in his theses by ignoring them:

Socialist literature and art must take over all the fine traditions of the past literature and art, and our writers must learn from their predecessors. But, since our literature and art are called socialist literature and art, they can only take the Communist world outlook as their ideological basis. Therefore they must, as the "Communist Manifesto" points out, effect "the most radical rupture with traditional ideas."

Total Capitulation of the Puppet Parties, March 1958

The final phase of the rectification campaign was marked by the complete submission of the "democratic" parties to the overlordship of the Communist party. The minor parties had never had any real independence, of course. The most embarrassing of the attacks on the Communist regime during the early days of rectification, however, had come largely from

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men who occupied prominent positions in these parties, and the surrender of the puppet parties to their Communist masters in mid-March 1958 was a complete, final, and highly publicized conclusion to that troublesome phase of rectification.

The necessity for sincere acceptance of Communist leadership had been one of the essential points made by Li Wei-han when he lectured the non-Communist parties in September 1957 on their future conduct. From that date until January 1958 these parties maintained a silence that was broken only occasionally by the exposure of some newly discovered rightist. As noted above, all eight democratic parties met in January 1958 and dismissed their rightist members from office. On March 1958, the standing committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Council, official mechanism of the united front, dismissed its rightist deputies. Their rightists having been disposed of, the puppet parties could then turn to the second requirement laid down by Li Wei-han--the "self-transformation" of their members.

The movement for self-transformation was ostensibly set in motion on 24 February 1958 by a resolution of 17 scientists in Shanghai who challenged their colleagues to become truly "red" experts by the end of the Second Five-Year Plan. The challenge was taken up by one of the democratic parties on the next day, and on 28 February representatives of all the democratic parties and of the "nonparty bourgeoisie" met and decided to launch a national competition in self-transformation. A mass meeting was held on 16 March as the first step in the campaign, and a charter was adopted which was intended to provide the bourgeoisie with a standard of conduct and ideology by which to guide their progress.

The charter opened with a reference to the "inspiring leadership of the Chinese Communist party and Chairman Mao Tse-tung," under which "the people of our great motherland are moving ahead along the socialist road like 'a ship riding the waves with full wind in its sails.'" The charter pledged the democratic parties and "unaffiliated democrats" to work "with revolutionary drive so that we may as quickly as possible change ourselves from bourgeois to working people living by our own labor, from bourgeois intellectuals to working-class intellectuals who are ideologically socialist and professionally expert." The charter then listed a number of specific pledges of action by which these goals would be attained.

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A gathering of 10,000 non-Communist "leaders" of the bourgeoisie was held on the day following adoption of the charter in the great square which is the usual scene of mass demonstrations in Peiping. The parade was amply covered in the press, most fulsomely by the Kuang Ming Daily, spokesman for the democratic parties. According to that newspaper: "The parade is beginning. Men's hearts are leaping, their blood is boiling, their feet move toward the left." As the demonstrators entered the square, the paper said, they lifted their heads and gazed "at the spot from which Chairman Mao reviews the October and May parades" and seemed to say, "Revered and loved Chairman Mao, and you other comrades of the central committee, please review our parade!" The theme of the parade was the slogan "Render up your heart to the party," and a conspicuous feature was a float bearing a large red heart suitably inscribed.

Prominent members of the bourgeoisie were quoted as offering their hearts as they had offered their means of production in 1956. There was a report that ceremonies took place at Peiping University in which students and professors carried model hearts in their cupped hands and offered them to the party cadres who controlled them. One minor party set aside a day for the giving of hearts and reported that 457 of its members in Tientsin, after "struggling all night," had produced a series of wall posters confessing to 50,259 mistaken words and mistaken thoughts.

During the balance of March and April 1958, the press carried many reports of meetings of scientific and academic bodies at which the intelligentsia was exhorted to serve socialism and responded by pledging themselves to do so. According to press accounts, these pledges were made with great fervor. There was probably a tinge of irony, however, in such pledges as that made by a group of ten septuagenarian members of the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee who pledge themselves to "become socialists within ten years."

The Chinese Communist party probably had several motives for permitting the non-Communist parties to continue an attenuated existence when they might have been abolished as part of the antirightist campaign. One motive may have been the desire to maintain the fiction of coexistence as an appeal to Chinese on Taiwan and elsewhere and to avoid giving offense to uncommitted opinion outside China. Suppression of the democratic parties would also have been an admission that the socialist

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transformation of man, a major tenet of the regime, is not always possible. In addition, the regime may have felt that the minor parties might still serve as a mechanism for the control and supervision of the bourgeoisie and "bourgeois intellectuals" whose knowledge and skill are still necessary for building up the country.

Liu Shao-chi Sums Up Rectification, May 1958

In spite of the intense publicity which preceded and accompanied its inauguration, the rectification campaign was allowed to pass away gradually and unspectacularly in the midst of a flurry of wall posters and public statements on progressively lower levels during the summer of 1958. Occasional references to the conclusion of the various stages of the campaign were made by certain units or levels of organization, beginning, of course with the central government organs in Peiping. References to the "victory" of the campaign also became more frequent at this time, implying that the campaign had been essentially completed.

Although the rectification campaign was not brought to a formal and ceremonial close, a speech by Liu Shao-chi in May 1958 marked the end of significant developments in the movement. The occasion was the second session of the eighth national congress of the Chinese Communist party. This session ought to have been convened during 1957--presumably in the autumn--since the first session had been held in September 1956. One reason for the delay in convening the second session presumably was the unanticipated need to extend the rectification campaign for many months beyond the period originally intended.

Liu's report to the congress was entitled "The Present Situation, The Party's General Line for Socialist Construction, and its Future Tasks." He laid heavy emphasis throughout his speech on the role of the rectification campaign, claiming that "in China, as everyone can see, the rectification campaign, led by the Chinese Communist party and conducted in accordance with the guiding principles laid down by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the correct handling of contradictions among the people, has achieved great results on the political, economic, ideological, and cultural fronts." The purpose of the rectification campaign, Liu said, was to "raise

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the level of Communist consciousness of the masses and to adjust relationships among the people in a systematic way so that they may meet the needs of consolidating the socialist system and further expanding the productive forces of society."

Assuming that the campaign would succeed, Liu said that "thanks to the victory in this struggle, a Communist ideological emancipation movement is taking place among the broad masses of the people which is bringing about profound changes in the alignment of class forces in our country." Liu claimed that most of the bourgeoisie were successfully transforming themselves, but he had harsh words for those who were not: "The bourgeois rightists are to all intents and purposes agents of the imperialists, of the remnant forces of feudal compradores, and of Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang." He asserted, however, that "as a result of the antirightist struggle, the anti-Communist, antipopular and antisocialist bourgeois rightists" had been thoroughly isolated by the masses and their ranks had begun to disintegrate.

Liu warned that the rightists might try again to attack the regime as they had in 1957, since "the main contradiction inside our country is and remains that between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie" and this contradiction manifests itself in certain fields as a "fierce life-and-death struggle between the enemy and ourselves." Liu maintained, however, that in most cases the contradictions between the two classes were those within the ranks of the people, a view which had again become fashionable after the reorientation of the campaign in September 1957. These non-inimical contradictions, he said, "should, as a rule, be resolved through the rectification campaign."

Liu credited the rectification campaign with great success in bettering relations between party members and the masses. "Leading cadres in many units," he said, "have made sincere self-criticisms before the masses and earnest efforts to improve their work and ways. This has greatly moved the masses and strengthened their faith in the leading role of the party." Liu said that cadres, at the same time, had been led to criticize their own shortcomings and rectify their wrong ideas and backward habits. He asserted that this situation has put both the masses and the cadres at ease "in all places where the rectification campaign had been carried out thoroughly; any estrangement that existed between them in the past has been eliminated."

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In spite of his earlier reference to the "victory" of the rectification campaign, Liu went on to describe the continuation of the methods of rectification throughout the country. "In the cities and countryside," he said, "in offices, enterprises, schools, and army units, wall posters are being put up, debates are being held, criticism and self-criticism are being vigorously conducted." The basic formula for rectification--"starting from the desire for unity, to solve contradictions through criticism or struggle, and thus to achieve a new unity on a new basis"--was said to have developed a new habit throughout the nation.

Liu stressed the virtues of criticism as a means of solving almost all problems facing the country. He claimed that many outstanding problems had been solved rapidly "by relying on the exposures, criticisms, and proposals made by the masses and their supervision and practical work." Optimistically appraising the situation, Liu said: "The masses openly criticize leading personnel by name and also openly criticize each other by name without mincing matters and without the slightest hesitation. The aim of such criticism and self-criticism is to serve the interests of the state and the collective, to do better work in the common cause of socialism." The attitude of the critics toward those criticized, however, was that of a real comrade, he said. "They do not aim to 'deal them a fatal blow,' but acknowledge their achievements and help them to correct their shortcomings and make progress. This is the noble Communist way of doing things."

Liu devoted the major portion of his speech to the regime's ambitious economic plans--summed up as the "great leap forward," which he dated from the spring of 1958--and the general line for socialist construction. At the conclusion of this section of his report, Liu tied the rectification process into the economic effort with the statement that one of the current tasks of the party was to work "unswervingly for the implementation of the general line for socialist construction" on the basis of the rectification campaign.

Liu then returned to the subject of the campaign itself. He reiterated the claim that it had achieved great results but warned: "We would be making a big mistake to become dizzy with the successes already won and think that everything now is all right." He further qualified his claim of victory with the statement that "in some units, some places, and among some

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people," rectification had "not been carried out thoroughly enough; it has not gotten down to the roots of things." Liu urged further energetic efforts to strengthen weaker units, check up on progress, and "persist in carrying through the rectification campaign to complete victory."

Liu re-emphasized the original goals of rectification in his declaration that "the central task of the campaign is to handle correctly the contradictions among the people and improve human relations in socialist labor and all other group activities." Liu mentioned types of contradictions which had received little specific attention in the course of the campaign. "Class antagonisms," he said, "are also reflected in relations between the ordinary administrative personnel and actual producers, between the ordinary brain workers and manual workers." A comradely relationship "of mutual aid and cooperation" had been set up between administrative personnel and brain workers on the one hand and the rank and file of workers on the other, he added, but warned that many of the former had not yet learned to treat the masses on a footing of complete equality. Liu insisted: "All functionaries--and first of all those who are members of the Communist party-- must, irrespective of their position or seniority, get rid of their bureaucratic airs, behave like ordinary laboring people, and treat their subordinates and the rank and file as real equals."

Liu said that in order to accomplish the above aims, "leading personnel at all levels must go down to the lower levels of administration and out among the masses. The system under which leading personnel at the national, provincial, municipal, and autonomous-region levels spend one third of their time each year at the lower levels of administration and among the masses must be carried through."

In a brief reference to the armed forces, Liu said that "the rectification campaign must also be carried through in the People's Liberation Army." He declared the campaign had already further developed the glorious traditions of the armed forces and that "the relations between the higher and lower ranks in the army, between officers and men, and between the army and the people have become still closer and the leadership of party committees of various levels over army units has been strengthened." Liu called for further strengthening of leadership over military work by the central committee of the party and by the local party committees. He said they should

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look into these things several times a year and thus greatly raise the political and military qualities of the armed forces.

Liu made another statement that appears to be somewhat inconsistent with his confident claims of victory for the campaign: "In those enterprises, offices, organizations, schools, and army units where reforms have been carried out, the rectification campaign will soon enter the fourth stage." This is the stage in which each individual studies documents and "undertakes self-criticism and self-examination so as to raise his own ideological level." His statement implies that no organization had yet reached the fourth stage of the campaign and that few, perhaps, had reached the third. Liu recommended that during the fourth stage of rectification "leading cadres at the county level and above, as well as those at the battalion level and above, should pay special attention to studying the party's general line for socialist construction and the Marxist-Leninist ways of thinking and doing things."

Liu admitted that it would be impossible to resolve all contradictions through one single rectification campaign. One reason, he said, was that "contradictions among the working people, such as those between the right and the wrong, between the advanced and the backward," would always exist and must be continually resolved as they arose. "That is why," he added, "from now on the method of the rectification campaign--the methods of criticism and self-criticism through full and frank airing of views, great debates, and wall posters--must be made the regular method of reforming thinking and improving work." Therefore, Liu declared, "all-round rectification campaigns" should be launched at set intervals to handle systematically the contradictions among the people and other contradictions which may have come to light.

Liu's final words on rectification were precautionary. He warned that strict distinctions must be drawn between the methods used to handle contradictions among the people and those "between the enemy and ourselves." The former type of contradictions should always be resolved by means of persuasion and education, he said, not by force and coercion. He also insisted that "in the fields of culture and academic studies" the policy of "letting a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend" must be continued. He described this policy as "a scientific Marxist method of promoting constant progress and advance in the sciences and arts" and added that this method was useful in resolving contradictions among the people. Referring to the utterances and

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activities of those who aim to undermine socialism and restore capitalism, however, "we have never sanctioned such utterances and activities, because they are not permitted under the socialist system."

Following the May 1958 session of the party congress at which Liu spoke, there was a new development of the "cult of personality" built around Mao Tse-tung. Since the drastic revision of the rectification campaign, the pretense had been maintained that the campaign had followed precisely the path laid out for it by Mao and the party's central committee. Beginning in June 1958, however, there was a further promotion of "the thought of Mao Tse-tung"--an expression which had been heard only rarely, if at all, since 1953. In the following months, party members and others in all fields of activity from the military to the universities were adjured to study Mao's contributions to their particular pursuits.

The new adulation of Mao may have been an attempt to recoup the damage presumably done to his prestige by the failure of the "liberal" policies with which he above all others had at one time been associated, although it had been confidently denied throughout the previous year that anything had actually gone wrong in the course of the rectification campaign. Whatever the motives behind the revived cult of personality, its scope and the enthusiasm with which it was pursued supported a continuing impression of the security of Mao's leadership.

### Summary and Conclusions

Liu Shao-chi's statements on rectification, which he delivered before the Chinese Communist party congress of May 1958, left the impression that the movement had reached full flower with regard to its doctrinal basis, whereas its practical implementation would continue for some time to come. This was indeed the situation throughout the remaining months of the campaign. Rectification progressed through its various stages and at varying rates in every organization and area of the country, although formal claims that it had been concluded in any specific instance were conspicuously lacking. Perhaps the final manifestations of this campaign took place in Tibet, where rectification was being applied to such problems as local nationalism and "great Han chauvinism" long after it had ceased to be of major interest elsewhere.

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Liu repeated the announcement made by Mao Tse-tung at Moscow in November 1957 that there would be periodic rectification campaigns held at intervals of one or two years. It is not likely that future rectification campaigns will reach the scope and intensity of the movement that began officially in May 1957 and drew to a close in the latter half of 1958. Piece-meal rectification campaigns held in certain instances, however, to correct local problems, will become a familiar part of Communist China's domestic scene, and campaigns of national scope probably will be declared from time to time to provide the necessary stimulus for continued progress toward the regime's economic and political goals.

Chinese Communist authorities stated during the recent rectification campaign that there was considerable precedent for the movement. The campaign of 1942, in which the term "rectification" was first used, was cited most frequently; the "three-anti" and "five-anti" movements of 1952-53 were also mentioned, as well as other, lesser movements. The goals proclaimed for the campaign which began in 1957 were, in fact, similar to those of the 1942 campaign. The 1957-58 rectification movement was rendered unique, however, by the vigorous and far-reaching criticism aroused during the early weeks of the campaign and by the extemporaneous "antirightist struggle" which it necessitated. It is likely, therefore, that the campaign of 1957-58 will be most frequently cited in the future as the primary example of the rectification process.

Whatever the intended course of the rectification campaign may have been, it can be seen in retrospect that the actual development of the movement fell into five fairly well-defined phases. Except for the formal beginning of the campaign itself, these phases were not marked off abruptly; even the most hurried shift was accomplished by means of a brief transitional period.

The first phase of the rectification campaign was an introductory period which may have begun as much as a year before the campaign was officially proclaimed on 1 May 1957. The introductory phase was definitely under way by September 1956, when the Eighth Party Congress of the CCP was convened. The major speeches at the congress prefigured the outlines of the coming campaign, especially its original objectives, which were to improve the working style of the cadres and to better the relations between party members and the masses. The specific targets of the campaign--bureaucratism, sectarianism,

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and subjectivism--were mentioned, and methods of "persuasion and education" were recommended. Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiang-ping, who delivered the major reports to the congress, advocated the encouragement of criticism by the masses and the participation of non-Communist personages in the party's attempts to improve itself.

The next important event in the introductory phase was the second plenum of the new central committee which had been elected at the September Communist party congress. On this occasion, in November 1956, Mao first issued a call for a new rectification campaign on the 1942 model, although his statement was not made public until early the following January.

The outstanding preparatory event preceding the rectification campaign was Mao's speech of 27 February 1957 on the handling of "contradictions among the people." In keeping with its "liberal" tone, the speech was delivered before a gathering of members of the puppet "democratic" parties and other non-Communist personages. The final introductory statement on rectification was published a few days later in the form of an article by the Communist party's propaganda chief, Lu Ting-i, long a spokesman for Mao. Lu presented a program for rectification which, with the important exception of the antirightist aspects of the movement, forecast quite accurately the progress of the campaign, including the link with the economic drive that characterized its latter stages.

The next phase of rectification began with the Communist party central committee directive of 1 May 1957 launching the formal campaign. This briefly recapitulated the objectives of the movement and the methods to be used as they had been set forth in earlier statements. Publication of the directive was followed within a few days by the convening of symposia at which non-Communist personages were urged to assist rectification by speaking out freely regarding Communist shortcomings. The formal opening of the campaign and the unexpected enthusiasm of non-Communist figures in responding to the invitations to criticize occurred within so short a period of time and were so closely related that the events of May 1957 can be considered as constituting a single phase of the rectification movement. These circumstances had the effect of postponing the original objectives of the movement and introducing modifications which affected every aspect of rectification.

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By the latter part of May 1957, the coming of the third phase of the campaign began to be heralded. Signs of this consisted first of statements by Mao and others that no word or action could be tolerated which was not in accord with socialism. This was soon followed by "spontaneous" meetings protesting the "rightist attack" on the regime. The phase which they introduced was the "antirightist struggle," which played so large a part in the balance of the rectification campaign. This antirightist struggle was most intense during June, July, and August of 1957. Justification for this digression was provided by publication in June of the much-modified "text" of Mao's February speech on contradictions, which set forth criteria by which to distinguish "flowers" from "weeds." At the session of the National People's Congress which convened a few days later, Chou En-lai again made it abundantly clear to his largely non-Communist audience that the contending of schools of thought and the blooming of flowers would not be tolerated in any sphere that touched, however remotely, on political and ideological matters. There were also many statements during this period by second-echelon Communist officials who contributed their bit to the vehement attack on "rightists."

The rectification campaign entered its fourth phase in early September 1957, when the publication of a series of editorials in the People's Daily marked the partial return to an emphasis on the original objectives of the campaign. These objectives were further modified, however, by the integration of the antirightist campaign into the rectification movement and the extension of the joint campaign to embrace nearly every group and organization in the country. The nature of this "new" rectification campaign was set forth for Communist party members in the speech by Teng Hsiao-ping before the central committee in September 1957. The task of assuring that non-Communist personages were familiar with the line to be followed was undertaken by Li Wei-han, chief of the party's united front department. After mid-September, the rectification campaign moved forward on relatively well-prepared paths which it followed throughout most of 1958.

The fifth and final phase of the campaign began with the new year and was again heralded by a People's Daily editorial. This was the period of the campaign's identification with the "great leap forward," when most of the energy

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of the rectification movement was directed along lines calculated to promote the attainment of the regime's new and ambitious goals. This was largely done, however, by applying the techniques already developed during the campaign, and it entailed no significant modification of the methods advocated in September 1957. The most conspicuous of the techniques thus employed was that of encouraging the production of wall posters as a means of criticizing the work of persons at all levels of every conceivable type of enterprise. This activity became so widespread that it resulted in local shortages of paper, ink, brushes, and wall space on which to display the finished posters. (According to one newspaper account, a husband and wife chided each other for domestic shortcomings and failure to exert the maximum effort in the service of socialist construction by posting criticisms in their bedroom.)

Thus the rectification campaign opened only after a long period of preparation and reached a peak of crisis less than a month thereafter as a result of the unexpected vehemence of criticism of the regime. About three months were spent in recovering from this blow and in consolidating and reshaping the campaign, after which it proceeded again toward its original objectives, to which had been added the elimination of "rightist opposition" and application of rectification to all aspects of national life.

Seen in retrospect, the rectification campaign exhibits many features in common with other campaigns which have been in progress almost continuously and often simultaneously since 1949. One of these features was the long preparatory period, during which the nature of the coming campaign was gradually revealed first in outline and then in increasing detail. Another feature common to most Chinese Communist campaigns was the highly publicized participation of non-Communist groups and individuals, which produced the sharp crisis in the rectification movement. The rectification campaign also utilized such familiar propaganda techniques as rigged "debates" and confident assertions that projected goals had already been attained.

The movement differed sharply from all previous campaigns in several respects. It surpassed any comparable movement in length and intensity, as well as in the degree

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to which it employed nonviolent methods to achieve its ends. Even after the unanticipated existence of vigorous opposition to the regime's methods and principles came to light and the bitter denunciation of "rightists" became part of the campaign, the "rightists" themselves were subjected to remarkably little physical punishment. Months elapsed between the denunciation of some nonparty officials at the ministerial level and their removal from office, and even then they were permitted to retain some of the prerogatives of their posts, such as residences and automobiles. Some who had been accused of the most treasonable activities were restored to office in the "democratic" parties within a few months after they had been dismissed. Chinese Communist party members who suffered penalties during the rectification campaign occupied party and government posts up to the provincial level. The punishments imposed on these persons ranged from reprimand to dismissal from the party, but again there was no known resort to violent measures.

The course of the rectification campaign--in particular the handling of the crisis which emerged--appreciably illuminated the methods of operation of the party leaders. The campaign once again illustrated what has been the most impressive feature of the operation of Chinese Communist leaders since Mao's ascendance in 1935--their ability to work smoothly together in implementing a decision, as well as to carry on as a group should that decision prove to be in error and a new policy have to be devised.

The Chinese Communist party, like other parties, is certainly not monolithic. The party does not formulate its policies, even within the limits of its dogma, solely on the basis of "objective conditions." On the contrary, personal rivalries and differing inclinations, of varying degrees of intensity and seriousness, may be presumed to be continually operating factors. Disagreements among Chinese Communist leaders--disagreements reflecting ambition, conviction, or both--are almost certainly expressed in the secret meetings of the politburo standing committee (the inner core of power) and the full politburo, the party organs which devise major policies. Once a decision is reached, individual leaders are bound by doctrine to carry out the decision regardless of their personal views. This is true of other Communist parties too, but none has seemed to operate as smoothly as has the Chinese. During the past 20 years, none of Mao's

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senior lieutenants is known to have been purged for taking a minority position or for failing to implement the decision of the majority.

It seems important, nevertheless, to attempt to calculate the differing positions which may have been taken in secret and which may well be adhered to privately after a party position has been established, because these lines of potential cleavage may become critical during Mao's last years as the party's leader, and especially after Mao has gone. Differing positions on major party policies are almost never clearly revealed in public, but must be surmised from variations in the pronouncements--or even, sometimes, from the silence--of individual leaders.

Any attempt to estimate differences in the positions of individual leaders is greatly complicated by the pattern in which the inner circle presents its official position--whether established by Mao's fiat or by compromise--to its various party, nonparty and foreign audiences. When circumstances require public statements, individual leaders tend to choose or be assigned different types of occasions. Mao Tse-tung, for example, makes most of his important addresses to large audiences which include many non-Communists. This is the type of occasion especially suited to present Mao as the party's and the people's benign father-figure. Moreover, Mao in recent years has withheld most of his important speeches from publication until events have made it clear what revisions will be necessary for an official version which will prove that he has been right all along.

Among Mao's senior lieutenants, Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping have in recent years been the pair principally charged with presenting detailed statements of major policies to major party meetings such as congresses and plenums; Liu is also employed to convey the "instructions" of the party central committee to various party and government organs. Premier Chou En-lai has usually been charged with reporting to the party on the work of the government and with providing detailed reports on party policies to government organs and gatherings. Lesser leaders also have typical occasions and audiences. This means that differences in content and tone in individual pronouncements usually can be most plausibly attributed to differences in occasion, audience, and immediate purpose.

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On the other hand, differences in individual leaders' public roles--both positive and negative--sometimes seem to permit conjectures as to what their private positions have been and perhaps are. [REDACTED] argued that case--persuasively to some, but not others--with respect to the Chinese Communist party's policy toward intellectuals. It was argued that Mao and Chou in 1956 and early 1957 favored a more nearly "liberal" policy toward the intellectuals than did Liu and Teng. It was further argued that Mao and perhaps Chou lost some prestige when the intellectuals bit the party's proffered hand, and that Liu and Teng had gained some prestige by having been bearish on the intellectuals from the start.

In the early stages of the rectification campaign--from September 1956 to late May 1957--there were occasional indications of possible differences among individual leaders as to the proper conduct of the campaign. Whatever the truth may have been, the crisis in the spring of 1957 pulled individual leaders tightly together in defense of their party and its basic programs, and thereafter there was no chink in which to lodge a speculation as to continuing differences.

As of September 1956, Mao, Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping seemed to be thinking of the coming rectification campaign in much the same terms, and they apparently shared a belief that the party was in a good position to risk popular criticism. There were, however, possible differences in their assessment of the degree of risk and their views as to the relative importance of the party's failings and the priority of the means to be used to correct them.

In early 1957, in reaffirming his concept of "contradictions," Mao went much further in a "liberal" direction than had other party leaders at the September 1956 congress with respect not only to the arts and sciences but also to Communist party relations with other parties. Various party spokesman--not including Liu and Teng--underlined Mao's positions. Mao's performance in this period, which was all the more striking because of Liu's and Teng's silence, suggested that his assessment of non-Communist attitudes was the most optimistic and erroneous of any of the top leaders. In May 1957, however, Mao responded quickly to evidence that the assessment had been incorrect.

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The first phase of the massive counterattack was carried out by People's Daily while Mao was revising his early 1957 speeches into the official version of June 1957--a version which permitted him to be the first party leader to state the new line in detail. During the rest of 1957, Liu Shao-chi, Chou En-lai, Teng Hsiao-ping, Peng Chen, Ko Ching-shih, Lu Ting-i, and Kang Sheng, current members of the party politburo, played important roles in helping Mao to conceal his--and to some extent, their--mistakes and to repair the damage. In 1958 the rectification campaign gave way to the campaign for a "giant leap forward" in economic development. At that time, Mao and his lieutenants, particularly those lieutenants who might have profited from Mao's mistakes in the early stages of "rectification," committed their prestige solidly to the success of the new campaign. In other words, there was no apparent attempt by Mao's strong lieutenants to exploit whatever loss of prestige Mao may have suffered.

At it turned out, therefore, the rectification campaign showed the Communist leaders' response to a crisis. The rapidity and unity of action of party leaders demonstrated once again that the maintenance of a united front took precedence over other considerations. It is uncertain whether this feature reflects primarily the importance of Mao as a unifying factor or a unique ability on the part of Mao's lieutenants to subordinate their individual interests to the common good. And it is uncertain, in either case, whether this unity will survive Mao.

One question remains to be considered with respect to the rectification campaign--its over-all effectiveness in the eyes of those who conceived and led it. The campaign had been hailed as victorious, of course, long before it lingered to an end. In order to determine the extent to which these claims of victory were true, it is first necessary to review the initial goals of the campaign and then to note the degree to which these goals had been attained by the latter half of 1958.

Superficially, the objectives of rectification were quite simple: to eradicate the evils of "bureaucraticism, subjectivism, and sectarianism" to which party members in positions of authority had been especially prone after the party's achievement of total power in 1949. There can be little doubt that these faults--common to any entrenched

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bureaucracy--were in fact prevalent within the Chinese Communist administrative apparatus and had seriously hindered a rapprochement between the party and the bulk of the populace. The eradication of these short-comings had the immediate aim of improving relations between party cadres and those over whom they had authority.

The elimination of friction between the party and the populace, however, was not an end in itself, but a means to a more basic end. The ultimate goal of rectification was the creation of an environment in which the regime's programs could be more readily imposed on the country. The "failure" of the liberalization measures that marked the early weeks of rectification, therefore, did not necessarily imply failure of the rectification campaign itself. After the "rightist" opposition had been brought firmly under control, the campaign proceeded toward its original objective. It was made quite clear, however, that no deviation from the line laid down by the Chinese Communist party would be tolerated.

Even though the path of rectification was more arduous than had been anticipated, the leaders were probably satisfied with the results of the movement. The appearance and defeat of a vigorous and articulate opposition to the fundamental policies of the regime, even though an unpleasant surprise, must have been counted as one of the successes of the rectification campaign, since it removed a hidden and potentially dangerous obstacle to attainment of the regime's goals.

Aside from neutralization of the "rightists," the authorities must have concluded that party control over every aspect of national life had been enhanced as a result of rectification. There had also been a considerable retrenchment in the number of personnel employed in governmental and economic enterprises, and a concomitant increase in the efficiency of the bureaucracy and management probably occurred. Since the long and unrelenting campaign was even more severe on Communist party members than on others, it is also probable that the incidence of arrogance and aloofness among the party membership was reduced.

The intensive use of wall posters during the latter stages of rectification was probably quite effective in forcing

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the correction of the more obvious faults of lower-level cadres and managers of enterprises. This technique also provided a means by which those with a grievance could blow off steam in relative safety; thus it may well have resulted in a significant reduction of tensions. The fantastic extremes to which the wall-poster campaign was pushed indicates that the party leaders considered it to have a real utility.

Two other major components of the rectification campaign probably contributed both practically and ideologically to the consolidation of party control during the campaign. The permanent or temporary transfer of cadres to the countryside or to lower-level units facilitated the retrenchment already noted and also had the effect of distributing throughout the lower levels a number of personnel familiar with the party's aims, methods, and organization. This personnel could also be expected to be more fully aware than local cadres of the general situation in the country, and they were thus in a position to implement party directives more efficiently than could local cadres alone. In the case of cadres who were required to make periodic visits to lower levels, the experience gained probably had the effect, at least in part, of acquainting them with the practical situation confronting them and with the difficulties encountered by their subordinates.

The "red and expert" requirement so heavily emphasized in the latter stages of rectification contributed to the consolidation of party control over the technical and economic advance of the country. Insistence on the primacy of political considerations in determining the usefulness of scientists and technical personnel resulted in a major loss of service of valuable people, but this was compensated to some extent by a greater assurance that those who remained would be amenable to party discipline.

The net effect of the developments noted above was more stable and pervasive party control of the entire social and economic structure of Communist China than had been the case at the beginning of the rectification campaign. In addition, the campaign stiffened the ideological discipline of the party and increased its efficiency as an instrument of the will of its leaders. That this was the estimate of the party leadership is strongly suggested by the fact that the

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establishment of "people's communes" on an experimental basis was undertaken in April 1958 while the campaign was still under way. By the following August, near the end of rectification, the Communist party leaders committed themselves to a rapid conversion of all of rural China to the commune system. The undertaking of this program of social reorganization, which dwarfs any comparable program in history, is the best testimony to the success of the rectification campaign of 1957-58.

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